An unusual homicide case with subsequent suicide

In the medicolegal literature reports on homicides followed by suicide, especially in elderly people, are rare. In the present case, the victim, a 79-year-old woman, showed a rather unusual injury pattern: 3 gunshots to the head (with only 2 entrance wounds and 3 intracranial projectiles) and 2 stabs from a knife. The tools used for inflicting the stab wounds (a hunting knife and a double-edged dagger) were left in the victim's body after the offense. The 89-year-old husband hanged himself with an aerial cable after killing his wife. The police investigations and the autopsy findings suggested a combined homicide-suicide. The motive for the offense could be a so-called delusion of poverty associated with symptoms of depression.     

Schweizerische Aussenpolitik im Wandel: Internationalisierung,Globalisierung und Multilateralisierung

Ausgehend von den drei Entwicklungen, wie sie sich in den Schlagworten Globalisierung, Internationalisierung und Multilateralisierung ausdrücken, geht der Artikel der Frage nach, inwiefern sich die genannten Prozesse auch in der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik identifizieren lassen. In der Untersuchung, die sich auf Staatsverträge beschränkt, wird diese Frage mit einer quantitativen Vollerhebung der aussenpolitischen Geschäfte für je vier Jahre in den 80er und 90er Jahren untersucht. Die empirische Analyse, die auf insgesamt 821 Fällen beruht, führt zu teilweise überraschenden Ergebnissen. Die Hypothesen zur Internationalisierung und zur Globalisierung liessen sich zumindest teilweise bestätigen. Punkto Multilateralisierung weisen unsere Auswertungen jedoch darauf hin, dass es in der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, was die Zahl der Staatsverträge betrifft, von den 80er zu den 90er Jahren zu keiner Verschiebung von der bi- zur multilateralen Zusammenarbeit gekommen ist.     

Justice, Democracy, and Hazardous Siting

In this essay we examine some issues of justice associated with the siting of hazardous industrial facilities. Utilitarian justifications of siting decisions are inadequate because they fail to address questions of fairness. Approaches that consider questions of distributive equity provide a better framework for siting justice, but are still incomplete. Limiting questions of justice to the distribution of benefits and burdens fails to examine the justice of procedures for deciding such issues of distribution. We argue that justice requires a participatory communicative democratic process for siting hazardous facilities, in two respects. It is prima facie unjust to impose a risk on citizens without their having participated in the siting process. Participatory communicative democratic procedures in facility siting, moreover, when structured according to specific norms of discussion and inclusion, are likely to yield the most just outcomes. We propose procedural as well as substantive conditions for such democratic procedures, and briefly apply these conditions to evaluate the siting of a landfill in Switzerland.     

Analyzing the turnout-competition link with aggregate cross-sectional data

Numerous papers by Public Choice oriented scholars and others have sought to test the hypothesis inspired by Downs (1957) that, ceteris paribus, turnout should be higher when elections are close. Most look in cross-sectional terms at variations in turnout at the constituency level for elections of a given type. By and large the results have been disappointing (see, e.g., Foster, 1984). We are skeptical of these weak findings and argue that a complete portrait of the turnout-competition link requires us to examine that link for at least three different types of turnout (turnout among potential eligibles, turnout among registrants, and turnout for a given office relative to other offices such as top of the ticket), and to take into account longitudinal changes in turnout. For recent off-year elections to the U.S. Senate and also for off-year elections to the U.S. House of Representatives in states where there was no gubernatorial or senatorial contest on the ballot, we find strong evidence for higher turnout among eligibles in close contests. For these elections to the U.S. Senate we also find evidence for an ecological effect that leads to turnout being maximized at values of competition other than 50–50. Moreover, when we look at turnout for office relative to top of the ticket voting in the California Assembly and the U.S. Senate in presidential years, we again find some evidence for an ecological effect in which turnout is maximized at a value of Republican vote share above 50 percent and find further strong evidence for a clear link between competition and turnout for office among those at the polls.     

Inspecting the Inspectors: Overseeing Labor Inspectorates in Parliamentary Democracies

Most theories of how to control bureaucracies are derived from American experience and are tested with data from the U.S. In contrast, this article uses evidence from the 15 members of the European Union to examine oversight mechanisms through which legislators attempt to control the bureaucracy. Analysis of European data shows that "police patrol" mechanisms of oversight appear in countries with relatively little gridlock as measured by the ideological range of their governments. "Deck stacking" mechanisms appear in countries that experience greater problems with gridlock measured in the same way.     

Democracy,Government Spending,and Economic Growth: A Political-Economic Explanation of the Barro-Effect

The paper develops a political economicargument for the recently observed inverseu-shaped relation between the level ofdemocracy and economic performance. A modelis constructed that shows why and howpolitical participation influences thespending behavior of opportunisticgovernments that can choose an optimalcombination of rents and public goods toattract political support. If the level ofdemocracy remains comparably low,governments rationally choose rents as aninstrument to assure political support.With increasing democratic participation,however, rents become an increasinglyexpensive instrument while the provision ofpublic goods becomes more and moreefficient in ensuring the incumbentgovernment's survival in power. As a consequence, an increase in democracy tends toraise growth rates of per capita income.However, the beneficial impact of democracyon growth holds true only for moderatedegrees of political participation. If –in semi-democratic countries – politicalparticipation increases further,governments have an incentive toover-invest in the provision of publicgoods. This model allows to derive and testthree hypothesis: Firstly, based on asimple endogenous growth model, weempirically substantiate our hypothesis ofa non-linear, inverse u-shaped relationbetween the level of democracy and growthof per capita income. Secondly, we showthat the impact of government spending oneconomic growth is higher in moredemocratic countries. Thirdly, wedemonstrate that the level of democracy andgovernment share of GDP are correlated in au-shaped manner.     

Zur Theorie der Interessenvermittlung: Ein Netzwerkansatz dargestellt am Beispiel der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik

Recent policy network studies contribute significantly to the theory of interest mediation. Despite this contribution policy network approaches still contain major theoretical deficiencies and a lack of empirical application can be observed. In this context a typology of systems of interest mediation is theoretically derived on the basis of new developments in the political exchange theory (Pappi/Henning 1998a). Analogously to the typology of economic markets, the typology corresponds to the social organization of political exchange in policy networks. Further, it is demonstrated that in contrast to conclusions found in the literature no general correspondence of specific types of interest mediation and policy-outcomes in terms of weak versus strong states, efficient versus inefficient economic policies and biased versus unbiased mediation of societies interests can be expected. In the empirical part of the paper the typology is applied to the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) using policy network data. In particular, a block model analysis is applied aggregating a set of multiple network relations among a multitude of public and private actors operating in the CAP to identify whether the overall social macro structure corresponds to national clientelism or supranational pluralism.