End of the Lone Wolf: The Typology that Should Not Have Been

This research note argues that the “lone wolf” typology should be fundamentally reconsidered. Based on a three-year empirical research project, two key points are made to support this argument. First, the authors found that ties to online and offline radical milieus are critical to lone actors' adoption and maintenance of both the motive and capability to commit acts of terrorism. Second, in terms of pre-attack behaviors, the majority of lone actors are not the stealthy and highly capable terrorists the “lone wolf” moniker alludes to. These findings not only urge a reconsideration of the utility of the lone-wolf concept, they are also particularly relevant for counterterrorism professionals, whose conceptions of this threat may have closed off avenues for detection and interdiction that do, in fact, exist.     

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Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy

Convergence between Woodrow Wilson's and Max Weber's thought, as well as their differences with regard to the politics–administration dichotomy, can be ascribed to the Hegelian tradition of public administrative theory. On the one hand, Wilson was strongly influenced by Georg W. F. Hegel. On the other hand, there is an empirical connection between Hegel and Weber. Both shared a consciousness of the German bureaucratic tradition based on Hegel's Philosophy of Right . These insights have important methodological and theoretical implications for the contemporary comparative study of public administration.     

Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina

Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low-performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975–83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low-achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown.     

The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world

This paper empirically analyzes whether government size is conducive or detrimental to life satisfaction in a cross-section of 74 countries. We thus provide a test of the longstanding dispute between standard neoclassical economic theory and public choice theory. According to the neoclassical view, governments play unambiguously positive roles for individuals' quality of life, while the theory of public choice has been developed to understand why governments often choose excessive involvement in – and regulation of – the economy, thereby harming their citizens' quality of life. Our results show that life satisfaction decreases with higher government consumption. For low, middle income, and male people, this result is stronger when the government is leftwing, while government consumption appears to be less harmful for women when the government is perceived to be effective. Government capital formation and social spending have no significant impact on life satisfaction.     

Measuring the capability to raise revenue: process and output dimensions and their application to the Zambia Revenue Authority

The worldwide diffusion of the good governance agenda and new public management (NPM) principles has triggered a renewed focus on state capability and, more specifically, on the capability to raise revenue in developing countries. However, the analytical tools for a comprehensive understanding of the capability to raise revenue remain underdeveloped. This article aims at filling this gap and presents a model consisting of the three process dimensions ‘information collection and processing’, ‘merit orientation’ and ‘administrative accountability’. ‘Revenue performance’ constitutes the fourth capability dimension which assesses tax administrations' output. This model is applied to the case of the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA). The dimensions prove to be valuable not only for assessing the how much but also the how of collecting taxes. They can be a useful tool for future comparative analyses of tax administrations' capabilities in developing countries. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perceptional inequality and preferential judgements: An empirical examination of distributional axioms

There are two categories of income distribution evaluations: first, the more-or-less “value-free” perception of income inequality as a statistical dispersion; and second, the valuation of income distributions according to an explicit social welfare function which is meant to capture all of society's value judgements. These societal value judgements can be expressed in the form of preferences. Whereas the inequality perception of income distributions appeals to an observer's sober judgement, the revelation of preferences with respect to specific income distributions appeals to his or her sentiments. This paper is an empirical analysis which investigates the juxtaposition of preferences with respect to income distributions and corresponding perceptions of distributional inequality. We do this through a questionnaire in which attitudes towards various distributional axioms are tested. The source of our data is 1773 completed questionnaires collected from five German universities. Based on our data, we observe that individuals' preference orderings over the set of income distributionssubstantially deviate from their perceptions of distributional inequality. In fact, our test responses showed that even when some income distribution is judged to be more unequal than another, that distribution might be preferred, as it accords higher incomes to each individual. We hold that the preference for these greater incomes expresses a compensation for the increased degree of inequality. This explanation applies both to equiproportional and to equal fixed-sum increases in incomes, which implies a support of Paretian ethics.