Beseitigungsanspruch gegen den unredlichen Bauführer bei geringfügigem Grenzüberbau

Au?erbücherlicher Eigentumserwerb an der vom Grenzüberbau betroffenen fremden Grundfl?che iSd § 418 S 3 ABGB tritt nur ein, wenn der Grundeigentümer vom Bau wei?, ihn vorwerfbar dennoch nicht untersagt und der Bauführer redlich ist. Im übrigen kann der Schikaneeinwand des Bauführers das Beseitigungsbegehren des Grundeigentümers ausschlie?en, wenn es überwiegend auf eine Sch?digung des Bauführers abzielt und die Wahrung und Verfolgung der sich aus der Freiheit des Eigentums ergebenden Rechte deutlich in den Hintergrund tritt. Die Rsp zum Eigengrenzüberbau ist nicht auf den Grenzüberbau von Liegenschaften, die verschiedenen Eigentümern geh?ren, übertragbar. Würde man einen Eigentumserwerb auch des schlechtgl?ubigen Bauführers am überbauten fremden Grund annehmen, geriete man in einen unaufl?slichen Wertungswiderspruch zum Schadenersatzrecht, das bereits bei leichter Fahrl?ssigkeit Schadenersatz, und zwar idR in Form von Naturalrestitution, vorsieht.     

Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective

We explore the impact of institutional design on the distribution of changes in outputs of governmental processes in the United States, Belgium, and Denmark. Using comprehensive indicators of governmental actions over several decades, we show that in each country the level of institutional friction increases as we look at processes further along the policy cycle. Assessing multiple policymaking institutions in each country allows us to control for the nature of the policy inputs, as all the institutions we consider cover the full range of social and political issues in the country. We find that all distributions exhibit high kurtosis values, significantly higher than the Normal distribution which would be expected if changes in government attention and activities were proportionate to changes in social inputs. Further, in each country, those institutions that impose higher decision-making costs show progressively higher kurtosis values. The results suggest general patterns that we hypothesize to be related to boundedly rational behavior in a complex social environment.     

Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion

This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich.     

The Outcome of Renegotiations between Institutionalized Public–Private Partnerships and Their Public Clients: Data on the Public–Private Partnerships of the German Federal Armed Forces

This study analyzes the renegotiations that take place between institutionalized public–private partnerships (PPPs) and their public clients drawing on survey data on the PPPs of the German Federal Armed Forces. Generally, both the party that initiates such renegotiations and the time at which renegotiations are launched determine the outcome of the PPP’s renegotiated remuneration. This effect is moderated by the degree of contract specificity and by a decrease in demand. Specifically, when the public client initiates the renegotiation of an incomplete contractual agreement due to a decrease in demand, it can successfully reduce the remuneration of the PPP.     

Contracting out local road and park services: economic effects and their strategic,contractual and competitive conditions

ABSTRACT

The economic rationale for contracting out local services is increasingly contested by empirical research. This article aims to contribute to this literature, first by scrutinising the economic effects of contracting out in local road and park services and, second, by exploring how characteristics such as markets, contracts, municipal strategies and contracting history influence these outcomes. Drawing on original survey data from Danish municipalities, we find that competitive tendering has on average reduced costs. Further analysis shows that savings are not associated with lower quality, thus indicating that ‘quality shading’ was not taking place. Another finding is that municipalities that repeatedly contract the services experience smaller savings, suggesting that competitive tendering is subject to declining marginal returns. Finally, we find that larger municipalities and those emphasising expenditure cuts realise larger savings, whereas the characteristics of markets and contracts do not seem to explain variations in cost savings.     

Inter-municipal cooperation in the case of spillovers: evidence from Western German municipalities

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the question: Does the existence of regional spillovers have an impact on the emergence of inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in tourism marketing? We use data from a survey conducted among Western German municipalities merged with official statistics regarding municipalities’ fiscal, political and demographic situation, as well as tourism-related characteristics. We are the first to apply a hazard model explaining the emergence of IMC. This method has serious advantages over the previously used methods. Surprisingly, our results show that especially municipalities with the opportunity to free ride start IMC more likely than municipalities without this opportunity. Apparently, under certain circumstances, municipalities are better off starting IMC than free riding.     

The G20 Chair and the Case of the Global Economic Steering Committee

Global and regional summits occur regularly, yet we know little about the factors supporting an effective summit. This article reviews knowledge about the chair, agenda building and prenegotiation preparation within an institutionalised régime, and then turns to our venue, the G20, and our specific case, the 2014 G20 Australian presidency. Through case analysis, we develop a Prenegotiation Framework, identifying tasks and key issues that are usefully addressed during summit preparation. Furthermore, we identify a linked relationship between the chair, their management of prenegotiation planning, the agenda that is adopted and the way in which that agenda determines public perception of the fundamental nature or “identity” of a particular international organisation. Thus, the prenegotiation process can have significant consequences for our understanding of those institutions engaged in global governance. We conclude that data no longer support a characterisation of the G20 as a global crisis committee, as an analysis of G20 Summit agendas demonstrates that it has evolved into a global steering committee. With its identity established, the effectiveness of the G20 as a global steering committee is the key question, while régime continuity and change constitute the real long-term G20 challenge.     

One in 20: the G20, middle powers and global governance reform

There is a growing consensus that the international system needs to be reformed to reflect the changing distribution of power with the rise of the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs). The Group of Twenty (G20) has been at the centre of these discussions. Within the G20, emphasis has been on great powers or rising powers and their capacity to drive reform. Less attention has been given to the preferences and strategies of middle powers in the G20 and their capacity to shape global governance reform. Drawing on interviews with G20 officials, this paper considers the role of Australia as president of the G20 in 2014. Australia’s presidency presents a unique opportunity to examine the behaviour of a middle power as it balances the competing global governance claims of the USA and the BRICs.     

Cooking the books: Bureaucratic politicization and policy knowledge

Accurate knowledge about societal conditions and public policies is an important public good in any polity, yet governments across the world differ dramatically in the extent to which they collect and publish such knowledge. This article develops and tests the argument that this variation to some extent can be traced to the degree of bureaucratic politicization in a polity. A politicized bureaucracy offers politicians greater opportunities to demand from bureaucrats—and raises incentives for bureaucrats to supply—public policy knowledge that is strategically biased or suppressed in a manner that benefits incumbents reputationally. Due to electoral competition, we suggest that the link between bureaucratic politicization and politicized policy knowledge will be stronger in democracies than in autocracies. A case analysis of Argentina's statistical agency lends credence to the underlying causal mechanism. Time‐series cross‐sectional analyses confirm the broader validity of the expectations and show that the relationship is present only in democracies.