Life Extension: Rolling the Technological Dice

The idea of radically extending average human life expectancy is an ancient one, but for most of human history exceedingly utopian. There is now, however, a revival of that idea, with some scientists and others arguing that it is possible and desirable. But the main problem with most of the life extension enthusiasm is that it is based almost entirely on the desire of some individuals to make it happen. The social consequences of success of such a venture are, however, either ignored altogether or dismissed on the grounds that any problems can be dealt with. In the end, none of our present human and social problems would be helped by radically longer lives and no obvious social benefits have been advanced to support it.

Relativism

Modern democracies increasingly confuse civic or political equality with a radical relativism that calls into question legitimate principles of hierarchy and the very idea of reasonable value judgments. This confusion reflects a “corruption,” in Montesquieu’s sense, of democracy rooted in a refusal to recognize distinctions that are integral to both human nature and social life. A moderate form of cultural relativism is a genuine intellectual achievement that helps combat ethnocentrism and allows one to better appreciate the full range of human experience. But criteria of meaning and truth are by no means entirely dependent upon cultural context. Our contemporary awareness of the “relativity” of cultures and historical experiences must be complemented by a robust appreciation of the universality of Reason and citizenship.

David Riesman and <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Lonely Crowd</Emphasis>

The reception of David Riesman’s classic sociological work The Lonely Crowd exemplifies both the possibilities and perils of the work of public intellectuals. The book was almost universally misread as a paean to inner-direction, and a lament upon the decline of the independent American spirit. But it was something rather more different, and more complex, than either of these things.     

Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis

Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms—uniform and discriminatory price sealed‐bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both with and without explicit communication. The clock appears to facilitate successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity).© 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

首都市民职业价值观状况研究报告

2008年,北京市社会科学院对首都市民职业价值取向状况进行了专题调研,结果表明:首都市民珍视工作稳定性,职业理想倾向于个人经济利益和自我价值实现,崇尚不断创新、乐于敬业的职业精神和职业态度,体现了新时期积极向上、忠于职守的从业价值观,形成了由物质实现、自我实现向社会实现逐层递进的事业成功观,认同通过个人努力获取成功的事业进取现.     

Why Do States Commission the Truth? Political Considerations in the Establishment of African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Although the use of truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) has grown considerably over the last 3 decades, there is still much that we do not know concerning the choice and the structuring of TRCs. While the literature has focused primarily on the effects of TRCs, we examine the domestic and the international factors influencing the choice of a commission in sub-Saharan Africa from 1974 to 2003 using pooled cross-sectional time series. We find that states which adopted a TRC prior to South Africa were generally repressive centralized regimes which used the truth commission as political cover. However, since South Africa’s TRC, democratizing states have been more likely to adopt a truth commission as a form of transitional justice.

Ideological Competition and Conflict in the Judicial Hierarchy

Circuit splits, or conflicting rules across multiple U.S. Courts of Appeals, have important policy implications and dramatic effects on Supreme Court case selection, yet we know little about the incentives ideological lower courts face when deciding whether to initiate conflict. This article develops a formal model of a judicial hierarchy where lower court judges are subject to review by a high court with distaste for unresolved conflict, termed “split-intolerance,” and with uncertain preferences over policy. Lower courts may compete by investing costly effort in legal quality to make their rules more attractive. In equilibrium, lower courts may initiate conflict even when the odds of success before the high court are remote. Surprisingly, lower courts grow more likely to create conflict as the high court's split-intolerance increases; however, split-intolerance can also incentivize greater lower court effort. I present qualitative evidence illustrating the model's explanatory power.     

Should algorithms be regulated by government?

There has been, and continues to be, an explosion in the use of algorithms across the economy and society. There are growing concerns about how algorithms are being used and whether they are accountable. This article reviews the literature on the issue of algorithms in several key areas, such as fairness, accountability, and transparency. The article examines arguments on why algorithms should be regulated, and it explores the available literature to identify how a potential Canadian regulatory framework may be developed.     

An economic theory of the regulation of preliminary measures

Preliminary measures adopted early in litigation are crucial for plaintiffs, given existing court delays and changing economic environment, but can also harm a blameless defendant. Therefore, some form of regulation is needed to minimize the harms that can result and discard non-optimal measures. Law and economic scholars have suggested that courts should control requests for preliminary measures, but this form of regulation fails to explain existing legislations, both in civil law and common law countries. This article argues that non-optimal preliminary measures can be more efficiently filtered through a strict liability regime, and that their judicial control should be residual.