Diplomacy Interrupted?: Macmahon Ball,Evatt and Labor's Policies in Occupied Japan*

Historiography on the Australian political and diplomatic role in the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–1952) gives disproportionate attention to the meetings between the Australian Minister for External Affairs, H.V. Evatt, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, in Tokyo during 1947. These meetings are then linked to the subsequent resignation from the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) of William Macmahon Ball, an Australian academic representing the British Commonwealth, and used to justify the claim that Australian policy towards Occupied Japan was unpredictable and ad hoc. This attention to Ball's resignation has distorted analysis of Australia's role in, and policies towards, Japan during the Occupation. This article argues that there is a need to develop a new historical discourse for the Australian role in the Occupation, one that moves beyond the intrigues of personalities and investigates diplomatic policy practice and its underlying ideals. This, in turn, may encourage other scholars to rethink the wider conduct and practice of foreign policy under the Labor governments of the 1940s.     

The Market for Financial Report Audits: Regulation of and Competition for Auditor Independence

The independence of auditors and the quality of financial report audits generally are rarely tested except in circumstances of corporate failure when alleged sub-optimality is present. Often auditors have good defences as to their expertise or competency, but rarely do they have equally convincing defences for the independence of their audit. A major issue for the regulation of auditor independence is that the threats to independence are often subtle and difficult to measure. This paper argues that firms undertaking financial report audits need to be transparent and competitive in respect of auditor independence. Two models that adopt this premise are proposed.     

Fiscal Management Implications of the TABOR Bind

Following a wave of state-adopted tax and expenditure limitations (TELs), in 1992 the state of Colorado amended its constitution with the strictest TEL to date. Called the Taxpayer Bill of Rights and known as TABOR, the amendment has limited the size and scope of Colorado governments. Praised as a restraint on unbridled government growth in good economic times, TABOR reared its highly restrictive head as the state economy turned downward. The central issue explored is how binding tax and expenditure limitations affect the state's ability to weather economic recessions and employ sound fiscal management practices. As in most institutional arrangements, the devil is in the details. The analysis presented here reveals that binding limitations create perverse incentives for budgetary actors to earmark, privatize, and shift responsibilities to other jurisdictions, which ultimately combine to reduce the state government's ability to perform and to maintain sound fiscal management practices.