Bäuerliche Hofübergabe unter Lebenden und (anerbenrechtliche) Nachtragserbteilung

In JBl 2010, 487–495, wurde dargelegt, dass der anerbenrechtliche Nachtragsanspruch der weichenden Geschwister (Miterben) gegen den Hofübernehmer sich nach b?uerlichem Gewohnheitsrecht beurteilt, dass also bei Wegfall der Rechtfertigung für den begünstigten übernahmspreis wegen gewinnsüchtiger Ver?u?erung des Hofes (oder von Hofliegenschaften) durch den übernehmer der Mehrerl?s auf die Miterben (weichenden Geschwister) nach dem Hofübergeber aufzuteilen ist. Der Nachtragsanspruch geh?rt also noch zum begrifflichen Umfang und Inhalt des nach b?uerlichem Gewohnheitsrecht zu bestimmenden begünstigten übernahmspreises (Wohlbestehenswertes). Die Fristen für den Nachtragsanspruch sind nach b?uerlichem Gewohnheitsrecht auf folgende Weise zu formulieren: Die Ver?u?erung des Hofes (oder von Hofliegenschaften) muss in die mit etwa 15 Jahren zu bestimmende Frist ab Hofübergabe an den Hofübernehmer fallen, die mit der Hofübergabe zu laufen beginnt. Dieser Anspruch kann nur nach Tod des Hofübergebers geltend gemacht werden, bei einer Frist für die gerichtliche Geltendmachung von 3 Jahren ab erfolgter Ver?u?erung (Einverleibung) durch den Hofübernehmer.     

Affordability and mortgage design: Permanent buydowns and buyups

Abstract

A simulation model that mirrors the actual practices of lenders in setting qualification requirements for mortgage loans is used to assess the impact of permanent buydowns and buyups on the maximum sale price that buyers can afford. Buydowns are reductions in the coupon rate traded off against higher discount points; buyups are the reverse. Although buydowns have little effect on afford ability, buyups can have significant effects. Their potential is largely unrealized, however, because of the call risk to lenders of loans carrying premiums. The authors propose a “discount recovery” provision, which would be similar to a prepayment penalty except that the payment upon prepayment would be tied to the amount of the discount foregone by the lender. This would protect lenders against call risk, giving them every reason to offer buyups as a way of expanding demand.     

Stepping out of terrorism

Terrorist organizations, groups, cells or just ‘bunches of guys’ are systematically compared with other types of criminal or deviant organizations: organized crime such as the mafia, street gangs and religious sects. Of course there are many differences between them, especially where motivation is concerned, but they share the common factor that it is almost impossible or very difficult for individual members to step out. However, de-radicalization may follow analogous paths: aging out, accepting exit programs in prison or disengaging ideologically. The article discusses the obstacles that a government strategy that encourages desistance from terrorism by stepping out may encounter. It may be sufficient and more realistic to discourage radicals from using violence than to try to de-radicalize them by using counternarrative techniques.     

Independent Candidates in China’s Local People’s Congress Elections

In the Chinese political system, according to the constitution, the people’s congresses at the primary level are the only institution which the voters can directly elect. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controls the “direct elections” and takes every measure in the elections to prevent grassroots power from entering even the primary-level people’s congresses. In recent years, grassroots power has kept struggling for its legal rights in the “direct elections” held in a few localities. The conflicts between the grassroots power and the authoritarian party in the “direct elections” have become an interesting political phenomenon, a subject deserves close observation and research. This paper studies the background of the independent candidates, their motivations and behaviour in elections. The paper also examines the party’s control in the elections and thus exposes the true nature of China’s people’s congress “direct” elections. The paper argues that independent candidates can have little impacts on China’s political structure at the current stage because of the party’s tight control, but their political participation has the most democratic value, compared with the “reforms” instigated and carried out by the CCP.