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William Roberts Clark 《国际研究季刊》1998,42(2):245-270
Two analytical distinct approaches to the study of domestic politics have been referred to as the "new institutionalism." The fundamental difference between the two brands of institutionalism can be seen in the way they handle the relationship between "agents" and "structures.""Structure-based" approaches to institutions give ontological primacy to structures and view agents as being constituted by them. "Agency-centered" approaches view human agents as ontologically primative and view institutions as structures that are created by goal-maximizing individuals. The two approaches are compared, with special attention given to the way they treat the preferences that actors hold. I argue that contrary to arguments made by many structure-based theorists, the agency-centered approach is capable of contributing to discussions regarding the sources of actor preferences. A limited information model of the strategic interaction between workers and capitalists is used to demonstrate ways in which the agency-centered approach can begin to make preferences endogenous. 相似文献
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Roger S. Clark 《Criminal Law Forum》1995,6(1):115-120
B.A., Victoria University of Wellington 1964; LL.B., Victoria University of Wellington 1964; LL.M., Victoria University of Wellington 1967; LL.M., Columbia University 1968; J.S.D., Columbia University 1972. 相似文献
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David Clark 《International Journal of the Legal Profession》2003,10(1):93-108
This article does not have an abstract 相似文献
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This essay presents necessary and sufficient first-order conditions for the general design of allocation mechanisms that decentralize Pareto optimal decisions in Arrow-Hahn-McKenzie (AHM) economies. An AHM economy is distinguished from the usual Arrow-Debreu private ownership economy since the consumption or production of any commodity may induce externalities, including initially endowed commodities. Because competitive markets will not generally internalize all externalities efficiently, the mechanism design must be generalized to include a rule that computes prices for commodities appearing as initial endowments so as to define consumers' individual budget sets. A natural design criterion for the generalized allocation mechanism is to have agents communicate both price and allocation messages to the center, enlarging the message space relative to that necessary for implementing mechanisms in Arrow-Debreu economies. The larger message spaces give agents increased flexibility, which has two significant consequences: (1) the dominant-strategy property of the Demand-Revealing Mechanism in economies with only public goods, a single pure private good, and quasilinear preferences, is lost unless the center adopts an enforcement structure that suitably restricts the allocation messages that agents may transmit; (2) if an endowed commodity is not a pure private good, then the Demand-Revealing Mechanism loses the dominant-strategy property, regardless of the enforcement structure adopted or of the nature of consumers' preferences, so that the problem is exacerbated in general AHM economies. 相似文献