Extension of the portfolio allocation model to surplus majority governments: a fuzzy approach

Scholars have long studied the conditions under which the cabinet making process will result in minority, surplus majority, or minimum-winning governing coalitions in parliamentary systems. Since Riker, a good number of these attempts have been based on rational choice assumptions. Among formal approaches in this vein, Laver and Shepsle’s (Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary governments, 1996) portfolio allocation model argues that parties centrally located in policy space have a greater potential for being part of any governing coalition and that parties located at the issue-by-issue median have a high likelihood of forming a minority government. However, the model predicts that surplus majority coalitions will only form when the number of salient policy dimensions in the political system is greater than two. We incorporate fuzzy set theory in the portfolio allocation model, permitting us to model ambiguity in parties’ policy preferences. The reformulated model accounts for the formation of surplus majority coalitions in two-dimensional policy space. We illustrate the model’s conclusions with a case study of the 1996 surplus majority coalition in the Lithuanian Seimas.     

Supplying Disadvantaged Schools with Effective Teachers: Experimental Evidence on Secondary Math Teachers from Teach For America

Teach For America (TFA) is an important but controversial source of teachers for hard‐to‐staff subjects in high‐poverty U.S. schools. We present findings from the first large‐scale experimental study of secondary math teachers from TFA. We find that TFA teachers are more effective than other math teachers in the same schools, increasing student math achievement by 0.07 standard deviations over one school year. Addressing concerns about the fact that TFA requires only a two‐year commitment, we find that TFA teachers in their first two years of teaching are more effective than more experienced non‐TFA teachers in the same schools.     

The American West’s longest large mammal migration: clarifying and securing the common interest

Over the last 10 years, conflict has grown over a 170-mile pronghorn antelope (Antilocapra americana) migration between Grand Teton National Park and the Upper Green River Basin in western Wyoming. Resolving conflict in the common interest is proving difficult. This movement is the longest mammal migration in the lower 48 states, spanning the jurisdiction of three federal agencies, three Wyoming counties, and over 40 private landowners. In addition, there are over ten non-governmental conservation organizations, two major state agencies, Wyoming’s executive office, and many citizens involved in the issue. There are three major problem definitions serving the beliefs of participants: the ecological-scientific (conservation biologists, environmentalists), local rights (local control, property rights), and cultural value (historic, western heritage) definitions. These definitions challenge the social and decision making processes of regional communities and government agencies. Underlying the problem of securing the common interest is the highly fragmented patterns of authority and control, misorganized arena(s), and parochial perspectives of many participants. Options promoted by participants can be loosely classified as top-down (government, expert driven) versus bottom-up (local, practice-based) approaches and reflect preferences for the distribution and uses of power and other values. Given the social and decision making context of this case, the bottom-up, practiced-based approach would likely best secure a common interest outcome.     

State making and bomb making in the Cold War

Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 2000), pp.xii + 525. ISBN 0-521-64044-X; pb. 0-521-79537- 0.

Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), pp.xiv + 273. ISBN 0-333-73685-0; pb. 0-333-94742-8.     

Rethinking Chile’s ‘Chicago Boys’: neoliberal technocrats or revolutionary vanguard?

The term ‘Chicago Boys’ remains closely associated with the orthodox neoliberal adjustment implemented in Chile by the Pinochet dictatorship. The conventional portrayal of the Chicago Boys is of a group of US-trained, technocratic economists who institutionalised neoliberal principles and technocratic prerogatives in public policymaking in Chile. This article will contend the Chicago Boys were much more than neoliberal technocrats: they were a revolutionary vanguard that designed and led a capitalist revolution and radically altered the material and ideological foundations of the nation.     

What Can We Learn From A Doubly Randomized Preference Trial?—An Instrumental Variables Perspective

The doubly randomized preference trial (DRPT) is a randomized experimental design with three arms: a treatment arm, a control arm, and a preference arm. The design has useful properties that have gone unnoticed in the applied and methodological literatures. This paper shows how to interpret the DRPT design using an instrumental variables (IV) framework. The IV framework reveals that the DRPT separately identifies three different treatment effect parameters: the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), and the Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ATU). The ATE, ATT, and ATU parameters are important for program evaluation research because in realistic settings many social programs are optional rather than mandatory and some people who are eligible for a program choose not to participate. Most of the paper is concerned with the interpretation of the research design. To make the ideas concrete, the final section provides an empirical example using data from an existing DRPT study.