Rebuilding the past: health care reform in post-Katrina Louisiana

After Hurricane Katrina, there was good reason to believe that a gaping window of opportunity had opened for Louisiana to revamp its safety-net health care system. But two years of discussions among stakeholders within Louisiana and extensive negotiations with federal officials resulted in no such change. This article argues that any explanation for this outcome needs to incorporate both structure and process. In terms of structure, the rules of the Medicaid disproportionate-share hospital (DSH) program give states substantial independent authority to decide which hospitals to fund. Federal authorities could not force Louisiana, which had historically turned its DSH money over to the state hospital system, to redirect it toward an insurance expansion. In the process of negotiation after Katrina, those who defended the institutions wedded to the prestorm status quo conducted a better strategy than their challengers. They narrowed the purview of the Louisiana Health Care Redesign Collaborative, set up to propose changes in the safety net to the federal government, such that the question of whether to rebuild Charity Hospital in New Orleans was off the table. Meanwhile, on a separate track, the state and the Department of Veterans Affairs successfully pursued a plan to jointly build replacement hospitals.     

What helps and what hinders the process of surviving the suicide of somebody close?

This paper presents similar findings about the lack of support and understanding for people bereaved through suicide from four different countries and reports on each country's unique response to this challenge. This paper reports on presentations made at the conference workshop of the International Association for Suicide Prevention meeting in Chennai in 2001, and on participants' suggestions of how best to help the bereaved.     

The case against compulsory casefinding in controlling AIDS--testing, screening and reporting

The spread of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) demands a comprehensive and effective public health response. Because no treatment or vaccine is currently available, traditional infection control measures are being considered. Proposals include compulsory testing and screening of selected high risk populations. The fairness and accuracy of compulsory screening programs depend upon the reliability of medical technology and the balancing of public health and individual confidentiality interests. This Article proposes criteria for evaluating compulsory testing and screening programs. It concludes that voluntary identification, education, and counselling of infected persons is the most effective means of encouraging the behavioral changes that are necessary to halt the spread of AIDS.