Public management reform and organizational performance: An empirical assessment of the U.K. Labour government's public service improvement strategy

We present the first empirical assessment of the U.K. Labour government's program of public management reform. This reform program is based on rational planning, devolution and delegation, flexibility and incentives, and enhanced choice. Measures of these variables are tested against external and internal indicators of organizational performance. The setting for the study is upper tier English local governments, and data are drawn from a multiple informant survey of 117 authorities. The statistical results indicate that planning, organizational flexibility, and user choice are associated with higher performance. Conclusions are drawn for the theory and practice of public management reform. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Participation and political protest: A causal model with Australian evidence

This paper examines a model of political participation and political protest that includes the several well-established modes of orthodox participation as well as a number of dimensions of political protest, and also takes account of the causal order between conventional participation and protest. The analysis indicates that previous findings demonstrating a substantial positive association between unidimensional measures of conventional and unconventional political behavior are incomplete and indeed somewhat misleading. The connection between orthodox participation and protest weakens as the style of protest becomes more unorthodox, to such an extent that none of the separate modes of conventional participation are directly related to radical protest. Using sheaf coefficients, the paper also tests the relative explanatory power of three sets of determinants of participation and protest: social background characteristics, general orientations toward politics, and attitudes toward issues. Issues are repeatedly weaker than the other two groups of variables in predicting conventional participation but have relatively strong effects on political protest, particularly compared with political orientations, while social structure is consistently influential.     

American Federalism: From Johnson to Bush

Intergovernmental developments for more than twenty-five yearshave produced a nation-centered federalism—strongly sofrom 1964 to 1978, somewhat less so from 1969–1988, anda little more so during the past two years. The reasons forthis fundamental systemic transformation include: (1) the demiseof the earlier, 150-year old, confederative party system andthe rise of a new political system with weak federative parties,but other more powerful political actors; (2) an operationaland local representational renaissance of the states, but alsoa concomitant decline of state and local political influencein Washington; (3) a steadily centralizing Supreme Court, withonly a few pro-state decisions until 1989; and (4) a rapid risein national preemptions and of a "new social regulation" thatwas aimed at state and local governments as much as at the privatesector, even as the states were used to implement them. Theonly real constraint on national activism since 1982 has beenbudget-driven federalism, not planned reform efforts. The currentsystem then requires political, representational, judicial,and constitutional reforms if the centralizing, cooptive, andpermissive features of contemporary federalism are to be corrected.     

Determinants of the probability and timing of commercial casino legalization in the United States

The adoption of lotteries by state governments has received significant attention in the economics literature, but the issue of casino adoption has been neglected by researchers. Casino gambling is a relatively new industry in the United States, outside Nevada and New Jersey. As of 2007, 11 states had established commercial casinos; several more states are considering legalization. We analyze the factors that determine a state’s decision to legalize commercial casinos, using data from 1985 to 2000, a period which covers the majority of states that have adopted commercial casinos. We use a tobit model to examine states’ fiscal conditions, political alignments, intrastate and interstate competitive environments, and demographic characteristics, which yields information on the probability and timing of adoptions. The results suggest a public choice explanation that casino legalization is due to state fiscal stress, to efforts to keep gambling revenues (and the concomitant gambling taxes) within the state, and to attract tourism or “export taxes.”