The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Protection: The Case of Software

The end of the twentieth century was marked by a sea change in global governance in the realm of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Whereas countries historically retained substantial autonomy with regard to what they defined as intellectual "property" and the rights granted to the owners of intellectual property, the 1990s witnessed the establishment of new global obligations regarding national practices. This paper focuses on the case of software "piracy" to assess the mechanisms by which the new global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are transmitted from the international to the national levels. We first consider a set of national-level factors that many scholars have shown to be important determinants of IPR policy. We then supplement the standard emphasis on domestic factors with an analysis of new transnational factors: countries' multilateral obligations under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and bilateral pressures from the United States to increase the protection of IPRs. Population-averaged panel data models are used to assess the effects of these national and transnational determinants on levels of software piracy in 80 countries from 1994 to 2002. Our results indicate that membership in the WTO and bilateral pressures from the United States—particularly pressures that offer reciprocal concessions—lead to substantial increases in levels of protection in rich and poor countries. There is, in short, a new international political economy of intellectual property.     

Interjurisdictional Competition and Regulatory Advantage

As formal trade and investment barriers fall, government regulations– what once were domestic policy matters – becomeissues of international concern. International commerce createsthe potential for competition among regulatory jurisdictions.This article explains why there is variation in these regulatorytrends. Three general ‘trajectories’ are: (a) convergenceamong countries toward less stringent regulations in some cases,(b) convergence toward more stringent regulations in others,while in still other cases (c) differences persist among countries.I offer three (related) propositions which explain the differentregulatory trajectories: #1) Regulations on production processestend toward laxity; whereas product market-access regulationstend toward stringency. #2) Industrial structure affects thestrength of the process/market-access distinction. Powerfulfirms in concentrated markets facilitate collective action andregulatory capture. Dominant producers push for process andmarket-access regulations which reflect their interests, givingthem a competitive regulatory advantage in world markets. #3)The asset specificity of investments affects regulatory convergence.Low asset specificity leads to a competition-in-laxity; highmultinational asset specificity leads to convergence among jurisdictions(as firms seek to lower their transaction costs); and domesticasset specificity leads to differences among jurisdictions.Detailed case studies (on offshore banking, capital requirements,and infant formula) suggest the propositions are necessary tounderstand general outcomes, although not sufficient to fullyexplain individual cases.     

Language disorders in disruptive behavior disordered homicidal youth.

Eight homicidal youths were assessed for language disorders and psychiatric diagnoses using a battery of standardized language tests and the Diagnostic Interview for Children and Adolescents. Both language disorders and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III-R psychiatric diagnoses were present in all subjects.     

Al Capone and the Internal Revenue Service: State-sanctioned criminology of organized crime

The story of Al Capone's rise and fall as a Chicago gangster has always depended upon selective dissemination of federal agency records, particularly records of the Internal Revenue Service. Capone history, therefore, is state-sanctioned history. The IRS view of the Capone organization, and of the tax evasion conviction, cannot be easily challenged without access to the corpus of the IRS records. Unfortunately, these records remain sealed from public access, despite the fact that selective releases were made prior to 1977 to journalists, popular authors, film producers and historians. Continued secrecy over the Capone records perpetuates a state-sanctioned criminology of organized crime. Calder v. Internal Revenue Service ¹ attempted without success to unlock the corpus of IRS-Capone records to investigate the state-sanctioned view.     

Statewide Assessment of Response to Domestic Violence in Louisiana

The Louisiana statewide assessment of domestic violence attitudes and services was a cooperative effort between the Louisiana Community Policing Institute and the Criminal Justice Program at the University of Louisiana, Monroe. The research project included both surveys and focus groups from Louisiana's eight law enforcement planning districts. Results indicate that the response to domestic violence in Louisiana is generally inadequate. Furthermore, problems exist with respect to the definition of domestic violence among agencies. Finally, four basic barriers to successful intervention were identified, including lack of resources, lack of education and training, victims' lack of confidence in the system, and lack of a coordinated response to the problem. Recommendations are presented for overcoming these obstacles.