Federal Reimbursement for Mandates on State and Local Governments

One of the remedies sought by state and local officials for the growing burden of federal mandates is a mandate reimbursement law. A major purpose of mandate reimbursement is to deter Congress from imposing excessive costs on state and local governments by making it fully accountable for its actions. The paper begins by extending the economic theory of grants to mandates and reimbursed mandates. It goes on to assess the benefits and costs of mandate reimbursement, and to distinguish mandates that should be reimbursed, should a reimbursement program prove desirable, from those that should not. Then, using the economic theory of grants and mandates, the paper compares reimbursed mandates with two alternatives for accomplishing the same objective, compensating grants and procedural rules. It concludes that the latter are more promising than mandate reimbursement.     

Restoring accountability in pretrial release: the Philadelphia pretrial release supervision experiments

As drug arrests and jail overcrowding added pressure to increase pretrial release in localities during the 1980s and 1990s, the need to manage a larger and higher-risk pretrial population of defendants awaiting adjudication in the community became a high priority for justice agencies. In the late 1990s Philadelphia officials sought to discover the ingredients of a successful supervision strategy through four interlinked field experiments to provide an empirical basis for a major reform of the pretrial release system. The results of the linked randomized experiments question common assumptions about “supervision,” its impact and effectiveness, about the underlying nature of the noncompliant defendant, and deterrence implications. The study emphasizes the importance of interpreting the findings in the context of implementation of the policy reform. Findings suggest that facilitative notification strategies wield little influence on defendant behavior and that deterrent aims are undermined by the system's failure to deliver consequences for defendant noncompliance during pretrial release. The most significant contribution of the article is its illustration of a major evidence-based policy reform undertaken by a major court system.     

Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust

Modern antitrust policy has a ‘love hate’ relationshipwith non-standard contracts that can overcome market failure.On the one hand, courts have abandoned various per se rulesthat once condemned such agreements outright, concluding thatmany non-standard contracts may produce benefits that are cognizableunder the antitrust laws.¹ The prospect of such benefits, itis said, compels courts to analyze these agreements under theRule of Reason, under which the tribunal determines whethera given restraint enhances or destroys competition.² At thesame time, courts, scholars, and the enforcement agencies haveembraced methods of rule of reason analysis that are undulyhostile to such agreements.³ In particular, courts and othersare too quick to view such agreements and the market outcomesthey produce as manifestations of market power. This articleseeks to explain why these agreements are still the object ofundue hostility.     

Effects of positional restraint on oxygen saturation and heart rate following exercise

This report assesses the effects on peripheral oxygen saturation and heart rate that positional restraint induces when a person is prone, handcuffed, and "hog-tied." Peripheral oxygen saturation and heart rate were monitored at rest, during exercise, and during recovery from exercise for 10 adult subjects. The effects of positional restraint produced a mean recovery time that was significantly prolonged. Consequently, the physiological effects produced by positional restraint should be recognized in deaths where such measures are used.