Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections

We examine the factors that improve the candidates’ likelihood of winning an election by drawing on information from campaign resources used by candidates running in the 2002 French parliamentary election. The main effects that we wish to analyze are the candidates’ gender, political affiliation and possible incumbency. We find that the contributions the candidates received and their political affiliations determine their acceding to the second round of the elections. But surprisingly once they make it to the second round, the contributions cease to be relevant; only the candidates’ gender, incumbency and the actual spending rather than the contribution levels matter.     

Understanding the development of fundamentalism

We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects in which leaders work to enhance their followers’ observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme.     

A minimax procedure for electing committees

A new voting procedure for electing committees, called the minimax procedure, is described. Based on approval balloting, it chooses the committee that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance to voters’ ballots, where these ballots are weighted by their proximity to other voters’ ballots. This minimax outcome may be diametrically opposed to the outcome obtained by aggregating approval votes in the usual manner, which minimizes the sum of the Hamming distances and is called the minisum outcome. The manipulability of these procedures, and their applicability when election outcomes are restricted in various ways, are also investigated. The minimax procedure is applied to the 2003 Game Theory Society election of a council of 12 new members from a list of 24 candidates. By rendering outlying voters less influential and not antagonizing any voters too much, it arguably would have produced a committee more representative of the interests of all voters than the minisum committee that was elected.     

Social Democracy or Social Liberalism? Ideological Sources of Liberal Democrat Policy

Liberal Democrat policy has been labelled as social democratic, yet the party has been reluctant to so describe itself. Taking Crosland's The Future of Socialism as a reference point, there appears to be much shared ground between social democracy and Liberal Democrat policy. Meanwhile, the party's tax policy adopted in 2006 takes the Croslandite approach of taxing wealth rather than income. Despite this, the article argues that the party is a social liberal rather than a social democratic one. These two political philosophies have so much in common that it is understandable that some commentators see the influence of social democracy where they might instead perceive social liberalism. Yet the two differ in their attitudes to the state. Both see a positive role for the state in furthering social goods. However, social liberalism shares classical liberal concerns about the dangers of an over-mighty state. This approach underpins Liberal Democrat policy.     

Competition and Selection in Municipal Bond Sales: Evidence from Missouri

This article describes the results of an interest cost analysis of local government debt issuance in the State of Missouri. In Missouri the vast majority of municipal bonds are sold on a “no bid” basis. We discuss the theoretical arguments for and against competition and selection. Then we determine the degree to which cost differences exist while correcting for any potential selection bias. We use data on local government general obligation bonds sold from May 2004 to May 2005 provided by the Missouri State Auditor's office. We find that this substantial lack of competition imposes significant costs on Missouri governments.     

The Revenue Impact of Repeated Tax Amnesties

Proponents argue that tax amnesties raise revenue both in the short and long run, by bringing former nonfilers back into the tax system. Opponents contend that amnesties produce little short‐run revenue and weaken incentives for long‐run tax compliance. However, over the last 21 years, 27 states offered tax amnesties for a second or third time. While previous research has estimated the impact of specific tax amnesties, none have estimated how the impact changes when offered repeatedly. We find that these additional tax amnesties generate less short‐run revenue than predecessors and tend to magnify revenue losses associated with disincentives for long‐run tax compliance.