Assessing the role of regulatory quality,favouritism, administrative requirement and licencing restriction in curtailing carbon emissions

The urgent need to achieve the Paris Agreement has compelled countries to set mitigation targets to curtail carbon emissions. Notwithstanding, stakeholders' effort to implement emission-reduction policies is often constrained by institutional challenges. This study provides new evidence about the dynamic relationship between institutional quality and carbon emissions in 63 industrialised economies. Using a reduced-form energy emission model and the system GMM technique, we exploit four institutional quality measures—favouritism, administrative requirement, licencing restriction and regulatory quality—and analyse their impact on carbon emissions. The results show that institutions play a fundamental role in mitigating carbon emissions. However, the abatement effect depends on the regulatory quality, the extent of favouritism, licencing restrictions and administrative requirements. Our findings reveal that stringent regulations such as licencing restrictions reduce carbon emissions in the short and long run. Administrative requirement such as emission reporting inhibits carbon emission in the short and long run, whereas favouritism worsens it. The results are robust to alternative model specifications. The findings from this study highlight the need for policymakers to pay close attention to favouritism, as it tends to reduce the effectiveness of emission policy regulations. Additionally, we argue for the need for stringent administrative requirements given its critical role in internalising carbon emission intensity in industrialised economies.     

Les Cortes et le Parlement au Portugal. 750e anniversaire des Cortes de Leiria de 1254: Congrès International, 26–28 novembre 2004—Leiria

SUMMARY

The Scottish Parliament, established in 1999, was to be a novel type of parliament and to herald a ‘new politics’. While it was inevitable that the Scottish parliamentary model would inherit some of the features of the Westminster system, one of the major parliamentary models in the world, Home Rulers insisted on the Scottish Parliament's need to adopt novel procedures and principles right from the start to keep it from becoming a ‘Westminister’. An analysis of Scottish Home Rule discourse in documents from the late 1980s and the 1990s shows that at the time, Westminster was constructed as an ‘anti-model’. This article establishes in what respects Westminster was an anti-model for the architects of the Scottish Parliament and describes the ideal parliamentary model which they defined. It then considers whether the Scottish model as it exists today conforms to their expectations. The case presented here is that the Scottish parliamentary system is indeed different from the British system in several fundamental respects, such as the fact that it is more committee-based and less executive-oriented, but that it is closer to the Westminster model than has been acknowledged, and that in some respects, the Scottish Parliament has moved towards that model by adopting typically British modes of functioning. Some characteristics of the Westminster system which it has integrated are the Presiding Officer's power to have a casting vote or, more controversially, the way the executive is held to account, through adversarial Question Times. The Scottish Parliament is thus neither a mini-Westminster nor an anti-Westminster: the Scottish parliamentary model is a hybrid of the West European and the Westminster models.     

Mozambique: Development through de‐mining

African countries, however much they stand to benefit from engagement with China, must set the terms and conditions of this engagement and ensure it links into their broader developmental strategies and long‐term development, rather than being seduced by the needs of elites.     

Book reviews and notes

FRENCH‐ENGLISH GLOSSARY OF FRENCH LEGAL TERMS IN EUROPEAN TREATIES. [Prepared by R. J. B. ANDERSON and R. J. DECKERS. Sweet &; Maxwell/Langenscheidt. 1972. 64 pp. £1.50.]

THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT. By ROGER W. RIDEOUT. [Sweet &; Maxwell. 1973. xvi and 94 pp. (inc. index). £1.75 (paperback).]

SWEET &; MAXWELL'S EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TREATIES. Edited by Sweet &; Maxwell's Legal Editorial Staff, Advisory Editor, K. R. SIMMONDS. [1972. xii and 334 pp. £2.85 (paperback).]

REVENUE LAW. By BARRY PINSON. Sixth Edition. [Sweet &; Maxwell. 1972. lxx and 690 pp. (inc. index). £4.25 (paperback).]

SWEET &; MAXWELL'S GUIDE TO ESTATE DUTY STATUTES. By G. S. A. WHEATCROFT. Second Edition. [1972. xiv and 170 pp. (inc. index). £1.90 (paperback).]

ACCOUNTING IN BUSINESS. By R. J. BULL. Second Edition. [Butterworths. 1972. viii and 279 pp. (inc. index). £2.20 (paperback); £3.60 (bound).]

GORE‐BROWNE ON COMPANIES. Edited by A. J. BOYLE and RICHARD SYKES. [Jordan &; Sons. 1972. cxlii and 1232 pp. £12.60.]

COMMUNITY LAW THROUGH THE CASES. By NEIL ELLES assisted by J. H. VALLATT. [Stevens &; Sons. 1973. xxviii and 411 pp. (including an index and tables of treaties and cases). £7.50 (bound).]

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. By D. LASOK AND J. W. BRIDGE. [Butterworths. 1973. 314 pp. £5.40 (hardback); £3.20 (paperback).]

THE E.E.C. RULES OF COMPETITION. By W. ALEXANDER. [Kluwer Harrap Handbooks. 1973. £4.90.]

EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS. By A. H. ROBERTSON. [Stevens/Matthew Bender. 1973. 3rd ed. xix and 478 pp. (inc. index). £6.00 (hardback); £3.75 (paperback).]

COOPER'S OUTLINES OF INDUSTRIAL LAW. By J. C. WOOD. Sixth edition. [Butterworths. 1972. lxxx, 512 and 41 (index) pp. £4.60 (limp); £6.80 (cased).]

CRACKNELL'S LAW STUDENTS’ COMPANION: CRIMINAL LAW. By T. CORE and C. L. MAUNDY. Second edition. [Butterworths. 1973. vi and 171 pp. (inc. index). £1.80.]     

Duverger's Laws: Between social and institutional determinism

Abstract. The purpose of this article is to relocate Duverger's Laws within the debate about the effects of electoral systems on the number of parties. Although Duverger's theory has always been seen as the best example of a purely institutionalist approach to the issue, it is possible to argue that this is only true if one overemphasises the meaning of the laws without considering Duverger's justification and explanations for them. However, if one takes into consideration not only the laws, but also Duverger's theories about the effects of electoral systems on the number of parties as a whole, one can argue that his theses do not have a purely institutionalist character and can therefore coexist with theories that try to take into account variables other than electoral rules.