Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: Evidence from Spanish Regions

The degree of fiscal decentralization in Spain is similar to main federal countries and greater than unitary ones. The demand of public sector decentralization is based on a supposed efficiency gains that is far from being obvious. Using a data set for the Spanish regions, we reject the null hypothesis of a significant relationship between growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and expenditure distribution among fiscal administrations. Nonetheless, we find empirical support for a relationship between revenue decentralization, far less advanced than the expenditure one, and growth. In both cases we do reject the null hypothesis of a nonlinear linkage between fiscal decentralization and growth in per capita GDP.     

The Strange Career of British Democracy: John Milton to Gordon Brown

Political debate in modern Britain has been structured by four narratives or traditions, called here ‘Whig imperialist’, ‘Tory nationalist’, ‘democratic collectivist’ and ‘democratic republican’. The Whig imperialist tradition goes back to Edmund Burke; it is a tradition of responsive evolution, flexible statecraft, genial optimism and abhorrence of dogmatic absolutes. It prevailed for most of the nineteenth century, for most of the interwar period and for most of the 1950s and early‐1960s. Its Tory nationalist counterpart is tense, rebarbative and often shrill. At its core lies a primal fear of the dissolution of authority and a collapse of the social order. Its most notable exponents include Lord Salisbury, Enoch Powell and Margaret Thatcher. The democratic collectivist tradition stresses ineluctable progress towards a just and rational society, to be achieved by a strong, essentially technocratic central state, with the power and will to replace the wasteful, unjust chaos of the market place by planned co‐ordination. Formative influences on it were the great Fabian socialists, George Bernard Shaw and Sidney and Beatrice Webb; it achieved its apotheosis under the Attlee Government of 1945‐51. The democratic republican tradition is much more inchoate: its exponents have been the awkward squad of British democracy. The most glittering stars in the democratic republican firmament were probably John Milton, John Stuart Mill and R.H. Tawney. It stresses active self‐government and republican self respect, embodied in a vigorous civil society and strong local authorities. During the ninety‐odd years since Britain belatedly acquired a more‐or‐less democratic suffrage, the first three traditions have all been tested, almost to destruction. But though the fourth has had great influence on social movements of all kinds, governments at the centre have done little more than toy with it, usually for brief periods. The great question now is whether Britain is about to experience a democratic republican moment.     

TACKLING HEALTH INEQUALITIES IN POST‐DEVOLUTION BRITAIN: DO TARGETS MATTER?

Since devolution in 1998, many aspects of public policy in Great Britain have diverged between England, Scotland and Wales, including how targets and performance assessment are used in the National Health Service and local government. Health inequality is an example where all three countries have recognized a need to act but approaches to performance assessment differ. Based on interviews with senior managers, the complexity of health inequality as an object of local intervention is explored and compared. Despite contrasting approaches to targets, local discourses in all three countries had significant similarities. Health inequality had to compete against a preoccupation with improving access to acute services generally and balancing budgets over the short term. There was a bias in the interventions described towards targeting health behaviours, but with limited use of evidence about efficacy, and indications that measuring progress with reducing health inequalities was starting to lead to an emphasis on ‘quick wins' from pharmacological interventions.     

UNRAVELING THE CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS ON STUDENT SUSPENSION AND JUVENILE ARREST: THE INDEPENDENT AND INTERDEPENDENT INFLUENCES OF SCHOOL,NEIGHBORHOOD, AND FAMILY SOCIAL CONTROLS*

Scholars of human development argue that a variety of social contexts affect youth development and that the interdependency of these contexts bears on the shape of human lives. However, few studies of contextual effects have attempted to model the effects of school, neighborhood, and family context at the same time, or to explore the relative and interdependent impact of these contexts on youth outcomes. This study provides an examination of the independent and interdependent influences of school, neighborhood, and familial contexts through an analysis of student suspension and juvenile arrest. Findings reveal that school‐based and family‐based informal social controls additively combine to reduce the likelihood of suspension and arrest. Moreover, for suspension, results support the hypothesis that an interdependent compensatory relation is present between the extent of collective efficacy in schools and in the surrounding neighborhood; school collective efficacy has a controlling influence on the likelihood of suspension that becomes even stronger in the absence of neighborhood collective efficacy. However, for arrest, an accentuating effect of school‐based social controls exists rather than a compensatory effect. A lack of neighborhood collective efficacy and a lack of school‐based social controls combine to exert a substantial increase in the likelihood of arrest.     

CAN HOT SPOTS POLICING REDUCE CRIME IN URBAN AREAS? AN AGENT‐BASED SIMULATION*

Over the past two decades, there has been a growing consensus among researchers that hot spots policing is an effective strategy to prevent crime. Although strong evidence exists that hot spots policing will reduce crime at hot spots without immediate spatial displacement, we know little about its possible jurisdictional or large‐area impacts. We cannot isolate such effects in previous experiments because they (appropriately) compare treatment and control hot spots within large urban communities, thus, confounding estimates of area‐wide impacts. An agent‐based model is used to estimate area‐wide impacts of hot spots policing on street robbery. We test two implementations of hot spots policing (representing different levels of resource allocation) in a simulated borough of a city, and we compare them with two control conditions, one model with constant random patrol and another with no police officers. Our models estimate the short‐ and long‐term impacts on large‐area robbery levels of these different schemes of policing resources. These experiments reveal statistically significant effects for hot spots policing beyond both a random patrol model and a landscape without police. These simulations suggest that wider application of hot spots policing can have significant impacts on overall levels of crime in urban areas.     

PARENTHOOD AS A TURNING POINT IN THE LIFE COURSE FOR MALE AND FEMALE GANG MEMBERS: A STUDY OF WITHIN‐INDIVIDUAL CHANGES IN GANG MEMBERSHIP AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR

The impact of parenthood on leaving a street gang is not well understood. This is likely because researchers in prior studies have not accounted for multiple dimensions of gang exit, possible gender differences, and potential selection bias. In this study, we use a sample of 466 male and 163 female gang members from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1997 to consider the within‐individual relationship between changes in parenthood and changes in claiming gang membership and offending. These data offer the opportunity to consider gender differences and birth parity (i.e., first or second child). The results from a series of fixed‐effects models reveal that motherhood is associated with enduring reductions in both the odds of claiming gang membership and the rate of offending, whereas fatherhood has a temporary beneficial impact on gang membership and offending only for those fathers who reside with their children. In most cases, the beneficial effect of having a child rests in becoming a parent for the first time. On the whole, our study findings demonstrate that parenthood serves as a turning point for a particular group of noteworthy offenders—gang members.     

THE IMPRISONMENT PENALTY PAID BY YOUNG, UNEMPLOYED BLACK AND HISPANIC MALE OFFENDERS

A recent study of sentencing decisions in Pennsylvania (Steffensmeier et al., 1998) identified significant interrelationships among race, gender, age, and sentence severity. The authors of this study found that each of the three offender characteristics had significant direct effects on sentence outcomes and that the characteristics interacted to produce substantially harsher sentences for one category of offenders—young black males. This study responds to Steffensmeier et al.'s (1998:789) call for "further research analyzing how race effects may be mediated by other factors." We replicate their research approach, examining the intersections of the effects of race, gender, and age on sentence outcomes. We extend their analysis in three ways: We examine sentence outcomes in three large urban jurisdictions; we include Hispanics as well as blacks and test for interactions between ethnicity, age, and gender; and we test for interactions between race/ethnicity, gender, and employment status. Our results are generally—although not entirely—consistent with the results of the Pennsylvania study. Although none of the offender characteristics affects the length of the prison sentence, each has a significant direct effect on the likelihood of incarceration in at least one of the jurisdictions. More importantly, the four offender characteristics interact to produce harsher sentences for certain types of offenders. Young black and Hispanic males face greater odds of incarceration than middle-aged white males, and unemployed black and Hispanic males are substantially more likely to be sentenced to prison than employed white males. Thus, our results suggest that offenders with constellations of characteristics other than "young black male" pay a punishment penalty.     

THE MYTH OF SOCIAL CLASS AND CRIME REVISITED: AN EXAMINATION OF CLASS AND ADULT CRIMINALITY*

Although recent empirical research questions the conclusion that crime is highest in the lower class, this empirical literature is plagued by limited measures of social class or of crime and by a failure to study systematically the effect of social class on crime in the adult general population. The present work was undertaken in an attempt to rectify many of the inadequacies of the class‐crime research. Self‐report data were collected from a general population of adult residents in a large, midwestern city and were analyzed to assess the effects of a wide range of class measures on crime measures. The overall results produced from a sample of 555 adults demonstrated that regardless of how class or crime were measured, social class exerted little direct influence on adult criminality in the general population. Consistent with research findings from nonself‐report studies, social class was related to criminal involvement for nonwhites.