The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation

The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard usually is understood to mean that the plaintiff must show that the probability that the defendant is in fact liable exceeds 1/2. Several commentators and at least one court have suggested that in some situations it may be preferable to make each defendant pay plaintiff's damages discounted by the probability that the defendant in question is in fact liable. This article analyzes these and other decision rules from the standpoint of statistical decision theory. It argues that in most cases involving only one potential defendant, the conventional interpretation of the preponderance standard is appropriate, but it notes an important exception. The article also considers cases involving many defendants, only one of whom could have caused the injury to plaintiff. It argues that ordinarily the single defendant most likely to have been responsible should be liable for all the damages, even when the probability associated with this defendant is less than 1/2. At the same time, it identifies certain multiple-defendant cases in which the rule that weights each defendant's damages by the probability of that defendant's liability should apply.     

The design of "the first experimental study exploring DNA interpretation"

This letter explains why a recent study purporting to show that exposure to domain-irrelevant information caused DNA analysts to misinterpret a complex mixture does not warrant this conclusion on the basis of the data from the study.     

STRATEGIES AND NEED FOR SYSTEMS CHANGE

Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of New York delivered the following address to the Millennium Conference of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges in Washington, D.C., on November 15, 1999. In it, she describes the development of the philosophy of the family court in the past century. Judge Kaye describes the family court's transition from reliance on social science to the incorporation of procedural due process guarantees in the Gault decision. She suggests that a further transformation is required to meet the needs of children and families in the 21st century. Judge Kaye proposes that in the next millennium the family court abandon the "remote adjudicator" judge who evolved after Gault to a "problem-solving model of judging… a judge who looks at the issues that are driving the caseload, who looks at the results that are being achieved, and who uses a hands-on style to figure out how we might do better both in individual cases and on a systemic level."
The New York Times described Chief Justice Kaye as, "A dedicated and effective reformer of the state's sprawling court system. Each of her hard won changes has had a positive impact." Chief Judge Kaye recently received the National Center for State Courts' William H. Rhenquist Award for Judicial Excellence in November 1999. On the occasion of the award, Roger K. Warren, president of the National Center, observed about her,"There are many who are working hard to better process the many cases that come before the state courts, but there are few working an harder or more successfully to better serve the people who use the state courts."     

Psychostimulant Use and Fatal Stroke in Young Adults

Psychostimulant use is associated with increased stroke risk. To determine the proportion of psychostimulant users among fatal strokes in young adults (15–44 years), all cases were retrieved from the National Coronial Information System (1/1/2009–31/12/2016). A total of 279 cases were identified: hemorrhagic (259), ischemic (8), thrombotic (8), and mycotic (4). Fifty (17.9%) were identified as psychostimulant users. Psychostimulants in blood were detected in 37/45 where toxicology was available, predominantly methamphetamine (32/45). Hemorrhagic strokes in the psychostimulant group were more likely to be intraparenchymal (OR 2.33). Psychostimulant users were less likely to be obese (OR 0.31), but more likely to have a history of tobacco use (OR 2.64). No psychostimulant user had a previous stroke history, was gravid/postpartum, or diagnosed with cerebral vasculitis or endocarditis. The work illustrates the substantial role of psychostimulant use in fatal strokes among young adults. In cases of hemorrhagic stroke among young adults, psychostimulant use should be considered.     

Clinical Characteristics of Fatal Methamphetamine‐related Stroke: A National Study

The study aimed to determine the clinical characteristics of fatal methamphetamine‐related stroke in Australia, 2009–2015. There were 38 cases, 60.5% male, with a mean age of 40.3 years. In no case was there evidence that this was the first time methamphetamine had been used by the decedent, and 52.6% had known histories of injecting drug use. The stroke was hemorrhagic in 37 of 38 cases. In 21.1% of cases, the stroke was purely parenchymal and, in 18.4%, involved purely the subarachnoid space. A ruptured berry aneurysm was present in 31.6% and in 68.8% of initial subarachnoid hemorrhages. There was evidence of systemic hypertension in 8 of 25 cases in which full autopsy findings were available. With increased use of methamphetamine, there is a high probability of increased hemorrhagic stroke incidence among young people. In cases of fatal hemorrhagic stroke among young cases presenting to autopsy, the possibility of methamphetamine use should be borne in mind.     

Are ‘pseudonymised’ data always personal data? Implications of the GDPR for administrative data research in the UK

There has naturally been a good deal of discussion of the forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation. One issue of interest to all data controllers, and of particular concern for researchers, is whether the GDPR expands the scope of personal data through the introduction of the term ‘pseudonymisation’ in Article 4(5). If all data which have been ‘pseudonymised’ in the conventional sense of the word (e.g. key-coded) are to be treated as personal data, this would have serious implications for research. Administrative data research, which is carried out on data routinely collected and held by public authorities, would be particularly affected as the sharing of de-identified data could constitute the unconsented disclosure of identifiable information.Instead, however, we argue that the definition of pseudonymisation in Article 4(5) GDPR will not expand the category of personal data, and that there is no intention that it should do so. The definition of pseudonymisation under the GDPR is not intended to determine whether data are personal data; indeed it is clear that all data falling within this definition are personal data. Rather, it is Recital 26 and its requirement of a ‘means reasonably likely to be used’ which remains the relevant test as to whether data are personal. This leaves open the possibility that data which have been ‘pseudonymised’ in the conventional sense of key-coding can still be rendered anonymous. There may also be circumstances in which data which have undergone pseudonymisation within one organisation could be anonymous for a third party. We explain how, with reference to the data environment factors as set out in the UK Anonymisation Network's Anonymisation Decision-Making Framework.