The Good,the Bad and the Ugly: Do Attractive Politicians Get a ‘Break’ When They are Involved in Scandals?

Political Behavior - In general, politicians involved in scandals of various natures are punished by voters. Good-looking politicians, on the contrary, are rewarded by voters. Almost fifty years of...     

Intimate Partner Violence Reports During the COVID-19 Pandemic First Year in Portuguese Urban Areas: A Brief Report

Journal of Family Violence - The COVID-19 pandemic raised concerns about the exponential growth of intimate partner violence (IPV), both in numbers and severity. This brief report aims to describe...     

Thought Crime and the Treason Act 1351

Liverpool Law Review - Has there ever been a law criminalizing mental states in themselves? We show that there has been, and still is: the Treason Act 1351. We argue for what we call ‘the...     

Is Inheritance Morally Distinctive?

This paper examines a rarely-discussed argument for the right to bequeath wealth. This argument, popular among libertarians, asserts that opposition to the practice of inheritance is prone to over-generalize, such that opponents of inheritance cannot avoid condemning other uses of private property, like gift-giving. The argument is motivated by an interesting methodological claim, namely, that the morality of bequest ought to be evaluated from the perspective of the donor, and not evaluated in ways that invoke the effects of bequest on the distribution of wealth. This paper argues that this donor-centric approach ultimately favors restricting the right of bequest. Specifically, I maintain that bequest generally carries a lower opportunity cost than other uses of property. Accordingly, inheritance tax is less coercive than other taxes, and bequest is less obviously as generous an act as gift giving. While the arguments made here will encourage traditional opponents of inheritance (such as egalitarians), I also suggest why they might be welcomed by at least some types of libertarian.     

Verfassungsrechtliche Bedenken gegen die RHG Novelle 2009

Im Jahre 2009 wurde durch eine ?nderung des B-VG und des RHG die Kompetenz des RH zur Prüfung privatwirtschaftlicher Unternehmen auf Betriebe, welche durch den Bund „tats?chlich beherrscht“ werden, ausgeweitet. Der folgende Beitrag m?chte zeigen, dass es nicht m?glich ist, diesen neuen Tatbestand ausreichend abzugrenzen. Somit handelt es sich um einen unbestimmten Gesetzesbegriff, welcher Tatbestandsmerkmal einer Kompetenznorm ist. Dies stellt nach der hier vertretenen Ansicht einen Versto? des § 12 (1) RHG gegen Art 18 Abs 1 B-VG dar.