Die drei Welten der sozialen Ungleichheit: Belohnungen,Prestige und Citizenship

Talcott Parsons’s contribution to an analysis of social inequality seems to have had a strange destiny: it was either neglected as if Parsons had not contributed to the problem at all; or it was rejected as an allegedly useless kind of functional analysis of social stratification of modern societies. However, I argue, there is no single theory of functional stratification. Rather, there are at least three versions that have to be seen as separate approaches: First, the theory of rewards as it was developed by Parsons and, more important, by Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore; second, the theory of moral respect, that Parsons presented in two different versions; third, the theory of a balance of equality and inequality in modern societies that Parsons developed following T.H. Marshall’s theory of citizenship. The article presents a historic and systematic analysis of these three strands of Parsons’s contribution to the debate on social inequality. While the theory of functional stratification failed as a whole, I show that Parsons nevertheless anticipated crucial aspects of recent sociological debates, like the importance of the vagueness and fluidity of social stratification, or the crucial significance of education being the most important resource for a realization of individual life chances in modern societies.     

Werbung und Unternehmensberatung als „:Treuhänder“: expressiver Werte?

This paper discusses the contribution of Parsons’s theory of professions that focuses on the specific modern relationship between value commitment and rationality to the analysis of the field of advertising and (management) consulting occupations, both being considered to be a new type of professions (named economic communicators of culture). However, there are some differences between the classical professions and these new occupational groups. One main difference is the significance of expressivity: advertisers are concerned with expressive functions of consumerism while consultants are implementing values of self-realization and individualism in the work sphere. Therefore, we refer to both, Parsons’s category of expressive culture and to his theory of symbolic media of interchange where he developed the idea that value-commitments are no longer anchored (internalized) in personality structures and institutionalized in occupational roles, but “circulating”. This idea stresses the role of reputation as a source of professional influence and recognition. The connection of these three elements of Parsons’s theory (professions, expressive culture, symbolic media) will contribute to a better understanding of the significance of these new occupational groups, the economic communicators of culture.     

What explains the Differences in the Tax Burden Between Swiss Cantons?

In the present article, we empirically analyse a series of competing hypothesis that try to account for the considerable disparity in the tax burden between Swiss cantons. Three hypotheses focus on differences in spending levels: The first explains differences in the tax burden with differences in citizens' demand for government services. The second emphasizes the differences in efficiency between cantonal administrations, whereas the third insists on the more or less easy access to cantonal instruments of direct democracy. However, when confronted to the data, none of these three expenditure‐based hypotheses are confirmed by our cross‐sectional estimations. On the contrary, our regressions lend support to the hypotheses which highlights the differences in tax revenues between cantons. These results suggest that it is not differences in government spending which account for the disparity in cantonal tax levels, but differences in the cantonal endowment with resources. This indicates that some financial equalization on the cantonal level might strengthen the equity of Switzerland's tax system.     

A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the basic rent-seeking model and a simple economic model of conflict. Each model is concerned with a game in which players invest resources in pursuit of a prize. The purpose of the analysis is to elucidate structural differences between the two models, and to analyse the consequent behavioral differences and equilibrium outcomes in the two cases. A key finding is that, where such comparisons are possible, the conflict model tends to involve greater relative expenditure on wealth-redistribution activities than does the rent-seeking model.     

Building majority coalitions for sub-majority benefit distributions

Public Choice - This paper poses a deceptively simple question. It asks, how can a program or group of programs that provides distributive benefits to recipients in a minority of legislative...