Multiparty electoral competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A model based on multinomial probit

A typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share. Here we use Euro-barometer survey data and European elite-study data from 1979 for the Netherlands and Germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response, based on multinomial probit estimation. For each of these countries, we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model. The latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics. The pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions. We use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions. We go on to propose a model of internal party decision-making based both on pre-election electoral estimation and post-election coalition bargaining. This model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions. We argue that maximizing expected vote will not, in general, be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation.     

Predicting the institutional effects of term limits

In this paper we develop a model to predict the seniority turnover, and transition consequences of term limit reforms for any institution with a regularized procedure for rotating membership. With this model we can predict the number of members who will be serving in their last term at any given time once an institution reaches a stable state under term limit reforms. For example, our results show that for the U.S. Senate current term limit proposals will result in a substantial increase in the number of “lame duck” members and a significant reduction in average seniority. We make no claims as to the public policy effects of term limit proposals. However, our model can be used to design a proposal that will maximize any benefits or minimize any public policy effects found to be associated with term limit reforms.     

Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual Differences

This article explores individual differences in citizens’ reliance on cues and values in political thinking. It uses experimental evidence to identify which citizens are likely to engage in heuristic processing and which citizens are likely to engage in systematic processing in developing opinions about a novel issue. The evidence suggests that political awareness crisply distinguishes between heuristic and systematic processors. The less politically aware rely on party cues and not on an issue-relevant value. As political awareness increases, reliance on party cues drops and reliance on an issue-relevant value rises. Need for cognition fails to yield clear results. The results suggest two routes to opinion formation: heuristic processing and systematic processing. Political awareness, not need for cognition, predicts which route citizens will take.     

John Rawls and Policy Formation

Liberalism has bay far been the most appealing ideology in modern political thought, and considered by many as one of human kind's greatest inventions, product of our development as a race. However, new theories have threatened the philosophical foundations upon which liberalism itself stands. One of the most strongly criticized theories is that of the Original Position, developed by the political philosopher John Rawls, and which is itself a fundamental cornerstone in Rawls's Theory of Justice. In this article, I will focus on discussing the problems and questions that arise for policy formation when analyzing the Orginal Position.     

Fair-Play Obligations: A Critical Note on Free Riding

McDermott rejects the argument that an individual, in receiving benefits from a political community, thus incurs a 'fair-play obligation' to contribute to the provision of these benefits. While acknowledging that an individual receiving benefits without contributing is 'free riding' and that free riding may be morally wrong, McDermott denies that such moral lapses entail communities having any right to demand support. Not contributing may be morally objectionable, but individuals may still have a right not to contribute. However, both proponents and opponents of the fair-play obligation claim do not sufficiently differentiate between different forms of free riding. Arguments tend to be based on rights that may or may not be invoked when individuals free ride through consuming externalities. However, this form of free riding does not entail any reciprocal obligations. Yet it can plausibly be argued that when free riding occurs in the case of the production of public goods, then communities can demand support from individuals, and can have a right to do so.     

“Robin Hood” and Texas School District Borrowing Costs

The “Robin Hood” system of school financing in Texas takes property tax funds from wealthy school districts and gives them to poorer districts. This paper examines Permanent School Fund‐insured, school district debt and discovers that under the “Robin Hood” system, Texas school districts with either Aa or A1 underlying credit ratings have higher borrowing costs than districts with lower ratings. Also, the borrowing costs of Texas school districts with underlying credit ratings of Aa and A1 are higher than those for non‐Texas, privately insured school districts with the same ratings, while the borrowing costs of A and Baa‐rated Texas school districts are lower.