Weniger Koordination,mehr Markt? Kollektive Arbeitsbeziehungen und Neokorporatismus in der Schweiz seit 1990

Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die These, wonach sich die industriellen Beziehungen in der Schweiz weg vom koordinierten rheinischen hin zum marktorientierten angelsächsischen Modell bewegten. Die Koordination zwischen Arbeitgeberverbänden und Gewerkschaften wird erstens im Bereich der kollektiven Arbeitsbeziehungen sowie zweitens in der Politikgestaltung untersucht. In einem dritten Schritt wird die Entwicklung der Repräsentationsmacht der Verbände seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre diskutiert. Nur wenig spricht dafür, dass sich die Schweiz vom Koordinationsmodell bewegt: Dezentralisierung und Individualisierung der Lohnpolitik haben zwar zu weniger Koordination geführt. Im Rahmen der Personenfreizügigkeit haben Gesamtarbeitsverträge jedoch stark an Bedeutung gewonnen. Die Verbände sind zudem weiterhin in den meisten ausserparlamentarischen Regulierungsinstanzen vertreten und spielen in der Wirtschaftspolitik die Rolle des Vetoplayer.     

Perception of epistemic authorities by children and adolescents

The study investigated children's and adolescents' perceptions of epistemic authorities in various knowledge domains. Children and adolescents from 4th, 8th, and 12th grades were asked to evaluate their father, mother, teacher, and friends as epistemic authorities in nine areas of knowledge content. In general, the results indicated that the perception of parents as epistemic authorities decreases with age. Nevertheless, children and adolescents continue to consider one or both parents to be the most important epistemic authorities. The perception of friends as epistemic authority increased relative to other sources in the social domains of knowledge. The perception of teachers as epistemic authority decreases with age, but in the formal knowledge domain it remains relatively stable.Received Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Research interests concern media psychology, knowledge formation, and school psychology. Requests for reprints should be sent to Amiram Raviv at Department of Psychology, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel 69978.Received Ph.D. in psychology from University of Pittsburgh. Research interests concern political psychology, social psychology of knowledge, and stereotyping.Received Ph.D. in statistics from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Research interests concern nonparametric statistics and applied statistics.Received M.A. degree in clinical child psychology from Tel Aviv University.     

Market-based incentives and residential municipal solid waste

Coalitions of free-marketeers, politicians, and environmentalists increasingly are turning to the use of market-based incentives in formulating environmental policy. One promising application of market-based incentives is in the management of residential municipal solid waste. This article focuses on unit-based pricing programs established in conjunction with community recycling programs. Using data gathered through telephone and mail surveys of 21 cities, we demonstrate the strong potential for unit pricing to improve the efficiency of residential solid waste management.     

SYMPOSIUM: RESURGENT ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The following is an edited version of the proceedings of a symposium sponsored by the Middle East Policy Council on May 26, 1994, in the Hart Senate Office Building in Washington, DC. Former Senator George McGovern, President of the Council, introduced the panel; Thomas R. Mattair, the Councis Director of Research and Policy Analysis, was the organizer and moderator; Michael Collins Dunn, Senior Analyst of The International Estimate, Inc., and editor of its biweekly newsletter, The Estimate, was the discussant.     

Rationality and the political business cycle: The case of local government

The empirical results which have been reported support the hypotheses' implied by the model of rational political behavior set out in Section 2. In pre-election periods, local government development expenditures deviate significantly from their normal levels. The extent of deviation is approximately 20%.Consistent with the predictions of this model, it is found that incumbents not seeking re-election deviated far more in their pre-election discretionary budget expenditure than incumbents seeking re-election. The expenditure gap between the two types of incumbents is large and statistically significant. Incumbents not seeking re-election exhibit a deviation equivalent to 47% of the development budget, while those seeking re-election exhibit a 12% deviation.