Scientific and legal standards of statistical evidence in toxic tort and discrimination suits

Many legal disputes turn on scientific, especially statistical, evidence. Traditionally scientists have accepted only that statistical evidence which satisfies a 95 percent (or 99 percent) rule — that is, only evidence which has less than five percent (or one percent) probability of resulting from chance.The rationale for this rule is the reluctance of scientists to accept anything less than the best-supported new knowledge. The rule reflects the internal needs of scientific practice. However, when uncritically adopted as a rule for admitting legal evidence, the seemingly innocuous 95 percent rule distorts the balance of interests historically protected by the legal system. In particular, plaintiffs in toxic tort and employment discrimination suits are effectively held to a heavier burden of proof in showing that their injuries were more probably than not caused by the defendant's actions. The result is that too many victims of toxic torts or employment discrimination cannot win legal redress for their injuries.Proposals to adopt stringent scientific rules of evidence thus implicate significant philosophical issues about the relation of evidence to belief and to practical action. The underlying objectives of the tort law system are not those of scientific practice, and each set of objectives has standards of evidence specific to it.Previous versions of this paper were read at the UCLA Law and Philosophy Discussion Group and at the Orange County Moral and Political Philosophy Discussion Group. We have benefitted from comments by Steve Munzer, Peter Aranella, Craig Ihara, Gary Watson, David Estlund, and Alex Rosenberg. A longer version of this paper is in preparation. In that paper we hope to develop some of the items merely sketched in this paper.     

Experiments in the Courtroom: Social Dynamics and Spectacles of Proof in Early Modern English Witch Trials

This article presents the composite social context surrounding the “experiments” that were used to prove witchcraft accusations in early modern England. It demonstrates that legal proof was not imposed by elite legislators and judges, or fashioned in accordance with the voice of scientific experts, but was shaped through complex social dynamics in which the middling sort and petty gentry fulfilled a crucial role. Through this process, popular beliefs percolated into judicial proceedings. Members of influential provincial families were the social agents who reconstructed old supernatural methods of proof into innovative rational experiments, often replicating public displays of proof that helped bolster the criminal charges and provided a competing arena of evidence. The article claims that the judges' cooperation with these “experiments” might have been an endeavor by the official legal system to circumvent the threat posed by a popular grassroots alternative to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court system.     

Revisiting the legal infrastructure for the confiscation of Armenian and Greek wealth: an analysis of the CUP years and the early modern Republic

Properties belonging to Ottoman Armenians and Greeks were seized through various laws, decrees and other legal regulations passed by the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter CUP) government, and later the cadres of the Republican regime. Both governments concocted ways of making this illegal process look legitimate by using the legal veil of the law. Central to this process were the economic outcomes of violence committed against Armenians and Greeks. The aim of this article is to analyze these laws and statutes, which were known as the Abandoned Properties Laws, and discuss the impact of this legislation on the process of the changing of hands of Armenian and Greek properties. It attempts to elucidate the dominant logic of the laws, decrees, and regulations concerning the abandoned properties in the periods of 1915–1923 and post-1923.