Building socialism: from ‘scientific’ to ‘active’ Marxism

Abstract

Historical materialism envisages law-like tendencies (‘scientific’ Marxism) promoting the development of productive forces and, concurrently, a political praxis (‘active’ Marxism) requiring human intervention. These positions give rise to conflicting interpretations of Marxism: first to understand society, second to change it – to abolish economic exploitation. The twentieth century witnessed a shift in the locus of the contradictions of capitalism to the economically dependent territories of the imperial powers. Socialist parties, when in power and adopting a Leninist political praxis, furthered modernisation and were successful in reducing economic exploitation. The paper addresses the relationship between the scientific and praxis components of Marxism in contemporary global capitalism. It considers post-Marxist interpretations of the changing class structure, the rise of identity politics and the evolving nature of capital. Forms of domination, oppression and discrimination (bureaucracy, patriarchy, racism, militarism and credentialism) give rise to their own distinctive forms of power relations. It is contended that they should not be equated with Marx’s crucial insight into the nature of economic exploitation. Many current Marxist (and ‘post-Marxist’) writers adopt a ‘scientific’ position emphasising the inherent contradictions of capitalism. The author claims that without appropriate political praxis, the resolution of such contradictions is unlikely to transcend capitalism.     

The End of Wilderness: Conflict and Defeat of Wilderness in the Grand Canyon

In the early 1970s, Grand Canyon National Park intended to designate its land to “Wilderness,” including the controversial Colorado River corridor. However, by the end of the 1970s the potential for Wilderness designation was off the table, and would never seriously return for genuine consideration. Using Schattschneider's model of conflict, we explain how the organization of this conflict privileges the “causal story” of Wilderness opponents, and therefore why the canyon is not designated. It is our contention that members of Congress will not stand forward to support Wilderness designations without simultaneously providing benefits for extractive land use because (1) congressional representatives are more penalized for supporting than opposing Wilderness designations, (2) Wilderness advocacy groups do not pressure congressional delegates as firmly as opposition groups, and (3) key local congressional members are not likely to see Wilderness as a salient issue worth the risk of negative exposure. If these findings hold, the implication is that we may have reached the end of significant Wilderness designations in highly visible areas, unless critical aspects in land use conflict change.     

REACH: A Step Change in the Management of Chemicals

The EU has regulated chemicals since the late 1960s using both general and sectoral legislation, and exposure-based, hazard-based and risk-based decisions. A new proposal from the European Commission – on the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) – will build on the experiences of the existing legislation and introduce some new concepts in the management of chemicals. This article is aimed at assessing the current chemical control mechanisms in the EU and those put forward in REACH to demonstrate how REACH is a new paradigm in chemicals management. REACH will carry forward today's experience and approach to the management of chemicals in the EU and introduces some novel aspects, such as utilizing market-based mechanisms and putting into operation the 'substitution principle'.     

RICO: The genesis of an idea

In 1970, the Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act. Title IX of the 1970 Act is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act or RICO. This Act had its origins in legislation going back as far as 1934, but coming forward to 1961. The 1970 Act borrowed ideas from this earlier legislation, principally “enterprise,” but also the use predicate statutes to define “racketeering activity.” The ideas are not new, but their combination affects how prosecutors and law enforcement agents investigate, try, and sanction violations of the Act. RICO’s drafting also reflects organizational theory and economic analysis. The investigation and prosecution of a single crime committed by an individual on a single day and in a single place maybe done using one set of procedural and evidentiary rules. Nevertheless, the investigation and prosecution of patterns of diverse offenses committed by, through, and against licit and illicit enterprises require sophisticated procedures, evidentiary rules, and criminal sanctions. In addition, antisocial conduct is more than a challenge to the administration of criminal justice; it also requires the full panoply of civil sanctions, including public injunctions as well private enforcement of injunctive relief and treble damages. RICO has had a profound effect on the prosecution of organized crime, white-collar crime, and other forms of similar criminal behavior. William J. & Dorothy K. O’Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; A.B. 1957, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1960, Notre Dame Law School. Professor Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1969-70 when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-542, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) was processed, Title IX of which is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act or RICO. For a general treatment of the statute from a variety of perceptive, see the collection of law review literature in G. Robert Blakey & Kevin Roddy, “Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning an Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding, Abetting and Conspiracy Liability under RICO,” 33 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 1345, 1348 n. 3(1996).     

'Tangential Relation' criterion clears way for infringement of amended patent claim under doctrine of equivalents

Prosecution history estoppel generally bars patent infringementunder the doctrine of equivalents when a claim is narrowed byamendment during examination, but the ‘tangential relation’criterion preserves that doctrine when the claim is narrowedin a manner unrelated to the particular equivalent which, itis alleged, infringes the patent.