Chinese bureaucratic politics and the origins of the great leap forward

This essay is a response to Alfred L. Chan's critique of my book, Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China This essay reaffirms the arguments of my book by examining the nature of politics in China in the mid 1950s through a variety of methods and some sources available after my book was published. It shows that bureaucratic politics was very common during the mid 1950s, that the Chinese political system was institutionalized, and that there were significant disagreements between top financial officials (Chen Yun and Li Xiannian) and top planners (Li Fuchun and Bo Yibo). It also argues in passing that Chen Yun was no ordinary planner; he was the most economically reform minded leader in the Soviet bloc in 1956–1957. In conclusion, I suggest some major questions for which conventional accounts cannot fully account.     

The State of American Federalism, 1994-1995

Federalism, as a concept and as a reality, received assistancefrom a variety of sources during 1994–1995. Opinion pollsrevealed a public strongly supportive of shifts in the balanceof power between federal and state governments. The new Republican-controlledCongress, bent on devolving authority to the states, busieditself with an ambitious legislative agenda. The DemocraticPresident pursued his principles of federalism and intergovernmentalrelations by supporting the unfunded mandates bill and by increasingthe use of the administrative waiver. The U.S. Supreme Courtbolstered federalism with its rulings in cases such as Lopez,a state challenge to the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act.The new mood in Washington, D.C. was complemented by state leadersanxious to take on the challenges of a rebalanced federal system     

Government 'strength' and budget deficits in advanced democracies

Abstract. Roubini and Sachs provided the first systematic test of the idea that political structure the size, composition, diversity, and/or stability of a governing cabinet - is related to budget deficits. In this paper, we take issue with several of Roubini and Sachs' choices concerning data and operationalization, and argue that their approach cannot offer clear conclusions about the relationship between national political structure and budget deficits. We test the 'strength of government' hypothesis using central government finance data on 16 countries, 1959–1990. We measure deficits in a way that maximizes comparability across countries but avoids the potential problems of standardizing by GDP. We examine carefully the definition and measurement of 'strength of government', in light of recent theoretical and empirical work in comparative politics. We perform pooled time-series regression analysis of deficit change in 16 OECD countries for the period 1959–1990. We argue that while structural differences between governments may have little impact on deficits during good economic times, they may become especially noticeable and influential during periods when governments struggle to cope with severe economic problems.     

Review essay

where he teaches business and public ethics. His most recent book, with William G. Scott, is Organizational Values in America,published by Transaction.     

The influence of state-level economic conditions on the 1992 U.S. presidential election

Evidence is found that state-level economic conditions played a significant role in the defeat of George Bush in the 1992 U.S. presidential election. Evidence is also found which indicates that the entrance of Ross Perot into the race as an independent candidate was not instrumental in the Bush loss.     

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES,PUBLIC SERVANTS AND DUE PROCESS

Abstract: The parliamentary system of government in its Australian form has a number of unresolved problems, notwithstanding its many virtues. One such problem is that of the role of public servants when called before parliamentary committees as witnesses. The current guidelines are mainly advice to public servants as to how they should avoid or defer questions which neither the minister nor the departmental secretary has authorised them to answer. Of course, this is useful and proper within its limits. However, it fails to address many of the dilemmas and career-threatening choices which can face public servants who find themselves being questioned in an aggressive, hostile manner by members of a parliamentary committee. Unfair treatment of witnesses is not a trivial matter and there are more than isolated instances. This article deals with an episode involving the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts in 1982. The case is now some years in the past, but it is still worth examining for what it teaches about gaps in our constitutional conventions. At the end of the article we suggest action in four areas. Intensive training and retraining is needed, first in the upper ranks of the public service, and secondly for chairpersons and members of parliamentary committees. Thirdly there is a need for MAB-MIAC to revisit yet again their guidelines on accountability and to instigate a review of the government's guidelines for public servants appearing as witnesses. Both sets of guidelines are anachronisms. Finally, we suggest that, in any future review of government policy in this area, consideration be given to the amendment of relevant legislation to bring due process and the protection of witnesses more closely into line with the rights available to persons appearing before a court.