State engagement with non-state justice: how the experience in Kyrgyzstan can reinforce the need for legitimacy in Afghanistan

Currently there is a question of whether and how Afghanistan should engage non-state councils of elders to resolve disputes. In order to harness their benefits (e.g. efficiency), control their abuses (e.g. occasional controversial resolutions), and stabilize the resolution of disputes, some have argued that formal links should be established between the state judicial system and non-state councils of elders in Afghanistan. Others argue that mere informal links between the two systems should be established. Still others suggest that prior models of state engagement in Afghanistan should be revived. In Kyrgyzstan, just 65 miles north of Afghanistan, the Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet administrations have used various methods to engage non-state councils of elders. Despite these vastly different attempts at controlling local dispute resolutions, elders independently resolved disputes outside of Tsarist and Soviet control and continue to resolve disputes outside of post-Soviet state control in Kyrgyzstan. This phenomenon highlights the need for legitimacy in any models of state engagement that are considered for Afghanistan. If, as observed in Kyrgyzstan, people do not use state-sanctioned local councils in Afghanistan, then their purposes may be frustrated. Therefore, in addition to reviewing the experience with state engagement in other parts of the world, policy makers in Afghanistan should also review the historical and contemporary experience with state engagement in Kyrgyzstan. As the need for legitimacy is reconsidered and applied to the design of models for Afghanistan, it may be more likely that those models will be used by more people in Afghanistan and that their purposes will be furthered.     

世界体系中的后苏联国家:欧盟新成员国、独联体成员国和中国之比较

自1989年以来,后苏联国家呈现出不同的沿革轨迹。这些国家大体上可以分为四个群体:欧盟新成员国(NMS)、独联体在欧洲的成员国、独联体在亚洲的成员国和中国。这四个国家群体对于当今世界经济政治体系的参与和依附程度各不相同。需要对它们在工业和贸易方面的能力作出界定,而这些能力对其经济的全球化和金融化产生着影响。国家群体对于世界体系的特定联系决定了其特定的经济(以及政治)能力和依附水平。通过考察它们各自不同的投资模式、贸易伙伴和金融依附情况,以及2007年以来世界金融危机造成的金融压力方面的影响,可以看到:一方面,欧盟的后苏联国家坚定地融入世界经济体系;另一方面,大型经济体(如俄罗斯和中国)有可能建立起本国的市场及网络,因而其经济自立水平要高于欧盟新成员国。存在着三种对于世界经济危机的主要反应方式:更深地融入占支配地位的世界资本主义制度、走向一个较少新自由主义色彩而较多协调主义的世界体系、形成以"对峙力量"和区域集团为标志的更加多元化的世界体系。     

Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture Lynchings in Twentieth-Century America

The most notorious lynchings that occurred in the United States between 1890 and 1940 involved publicity, crowds, ritual, and abnormal cruelty. Several hundred of these "public torture lynchings" took place, most of them in the Deep South. The author develops an interpretation that takes seriously the specific forms and discourses that lynchers and their supporters used to describe and justify these events—characterizing them as criminal punishments, albeit summary, informal ones that were shaped by a white supremacist culture and a politics of racial domination. An interpretation of the penal context and meanings of these public torture lynchings helps us understand their specific forms and their claims to legitimacy. The penal character of these lynchings increased the probability that they would be tolerated by local (and even national) audiences and thus made them a strategic form of violence in struggles to maintain racial supremacy. The author argues that a consideration of these events should lead us to revise our standard narratives about the evolution of modern punishments.     

Democratically consolidated,externally threatened,and NATO aligned: finding unexpected deficiencies in civilian control

It has long been presumed in the literature that consolidated democracies that face serious external threats or are NATO-aligned should feature strong, civilian control institutions and personnel. This study of Israel, India, Taiwan, Spain and Poland reveals otherwise. Utilizing biographical data compiled by the authors, we researched civilian personnel within each country’s defence ministry – the organizational hub of civil-military relations. Rather than finding evidence of strong civilian control, what we found instead were ministries with serious deficiencies: they did not have effective power; they failed to engage in defence planning or provide strategic guidance to the armed forces; they were led by military personnel and staffed by civilian employees not properly qualified to handle defence affairs. To explain these discrepancies, we argue that long-standing deficits in civilian expertise spur the delegation of ministerial defence positions to more knowledgeable officers. Comparisons are made with benchmark states that have achieved civilian ministerial control.     

Correction to: Frankenstein in Grozny: vertical and horizontal cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov’s rule

Asia Europe Journal - Many scholars have suggested that organized violence in Chechnya has ended, and that Russia’s Chechenization policy and Ramzan Kadyrov’s presidency deserve the...     

Does gang membership pay? Illegal and legal earnings through emerging adulthood*

Gang membership is believed to impede success in the legitimate economic market while simultaneously supporting success in the illegal market. We extend the study of the economic effects of gang membership by using a within‐ and between‐individual analytic design, decomposing gang membership into multiple statuses (i.e., entering a gang, continuously in a gang, leaving a gang, and inactive gang membership), examining legal and illegal earnings simultaneously, and accounting for factors endogenous to gang membership that may contribute to economic achievement. By using panel data from 1,213 individuals who participated in the Pathways to Desistance Study to conduct a multilevel path analysis, we find that active gang membership status is unrelated to legal earnings. Alternatively, entering a gang is associated with increased illegal earnings, attributable to changes in delinquent peers and drug use, whereas leaving a gang has a direct relationship with decreased illegal earnings. Our results indicate that the positive economic effect of gang membership (i.e., illegal earnings and total earnings) is short‐lived and that, on balance, the sum of the gang membership experience does not “pay” in terms of overall earnings.