STRUCTURES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT: REVOLUTION VERSUS SECESSION IN RWANDA AND SRI LANKA

A structural framework of ethnic politics is presented, contrasting the patterns of inter-ethnic relations found in ranked versus unranked systems of ethnic stratification. This framework allows us to account for why ethnic conflict erupts in some cases but not others, and why that conflict takes the form of ethnic revolution in some situations and ethnic separatism in others. This framework's explanatory utility is illustrated with a comparison of case studies: why ethnic separatism emerged in Sri Lanka while ethnic revolution occurred in Rwanda.     

Ministers,Markets and Missiles: The British Government,the European Economic Community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1964–68

Existing accounts of British efforts to achieve a nuclear non-proliferation treaty between 1964 and 1968 largely overlook the later stages of decision making within the Labour government. Scrutiny of previously classified sources reveals that a desire for entry into the European Economic Community had a much larger influence on the content and conduct of British non-proliferation policy than previously suggested. By 1967, Prime Minister Harold Wilson sought a secondary role in treaty negotiations, and left the running to the superpowers. This avoided unnecessary conflict with the countries of the Community, resentful of the Treaty's discriminatory terms, and helped to protect Britain's application to join the EEC. Although this bid was unsuccessful, ambitions for future membership continued to influence non-proliferation policy in 1968. Indeed, a desire for future entry into the EEC helps to explain why Britain became the first nuclear weapon state to ratify the Treaty.     

Revisionism and Its Variants: Understanding State Reactions to Foreign Policy Failure

States respond to failure in different ways. In light of the phenomenon of revisionist states, it is particularly important to understand why some revisionist states revert to status quo pursuits in the face of policy failure, while others pursue revisionism even in the face of external developments that we might expect would push them toward moderation. Domestic structure, domestic politics, and elite ideology each contribute to an explanation of how revisionist states respond to policy failure, but none of these variables alone tells the full story. As is illustrated through case studies of Iranian, Israeli, and Iraqi foreign policy in the 1980s, domestic structure plays the launching role in the analysis of how a revisionist state will behave. Regime type structures the incentives facing leaders and determines whether domestic politics or elite ideology is determinative in predicting a revisionist state's reactions to failure.     

Should the Law Convict Those Who Act from Conviction? Reflections on a Demands-of-Conscience Criminal Defense

How should the judge or jury in a just criminal court treat a civil disobedient, someone who performs a conscientiously motivated communicative breach of the criminal law? Kimberley Brownlee contends that all else equal a court of law should neither convict nor punish such offenders. Though I agree with this conclusion, I contend that Brownlee mischaracterizes the nature of the criminal defense to which civil disobedients are entitled. Whereas Brownlee maintains that such actors ought to be excused for their criminal breach, I argue that they ought to enjoy a justification defense. Acts of civil disobedience are not (morally) wrongful violations of the law for which an actor ought not to be blamed; rather, they are violations of the law that are not (morally) wrong in virtue of their illegality. It is the absence of wrongdoing, and not merely the absence of fault, that renders the conviction and punishment of those who perform acts of civil disobedience inappropriate.