The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting

Congress confronts two major organizational problems that affect the behavior of legislators, party leaders, and groups doing business with congressional committees: The costly nature of monitoring and the absence of explicit mechanisms for upholding agreements. The problem of monitoring implies that party leaders will have a difficult time influencing decisions made in decision-making arenas where the actions of legislators are less visible, as in congressional committees. While legislators can evade leadership monitoring of their actions within committees, once an issue leaves a committee, the costs of monitoring decline, and leadership influence increases. The absence of mechanisms for assuring that legislators keep their bargains means that groups will place an emphasis on dealing with reliable legislators — those who can be counted upon to uphold their end of a bargain. Thus, party leaders are more effective in influencing floor voting because of their better ability to monitor legislator behavior; however, obligations to important interest groups will be more immune to leadership influence because of the incentives for committee members to adhere to their bargains.     

On the Nature of Tolerance: Dichotomous or Continuous?*

The purpose of this article is to reconsider the claim made recently by Mondak and Sanders that political tolerance ought to be thought to be a dichotomous rather than continuous variable. Using data from both Russia and the United States, I demonstrate that those Mondak and Sanders regard as uniquely tolerant are most likely no more than people who were given insufficient opportunity to express their intolerance. Even if such a phenomenon of “absolute tolerance” exists (all ideas expressed in all ways are to be tolerated), it is sufficiently rare that few practical implications are indicated for those doing empirical work on political tolerance and intolerance. * I appreciate the valuable comments of Jeffcry Mondak on an earlier version of this paper.     

Reform of the Planning,Programming, Budgeting System,and Management Control in the U.S. Department of Defense: Insights from Budget Theory

Resource decision making for the Department of Defense (DOD) is one of the most challenging tasks in all of public financial management. DOD coordinates national security threat assessment, long‐ and intermediate‐range planning and programming with annual budget formulation and execution. Between 2001 and 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld changed the system significantly, simplifying, and synchronizing it with presidential terms of office. We assess Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) reform through application of applied budget theory. We review system evolution, document recent reforms, explain why change was necessary, and assess implementation feasibility. Only preliminary evaluation is possible because change implementation will require five or more years.     

Intervention and Empire: John Stuart Mill and International Relations

It is surprising that John Stuart Mill's international thought, which focuses on intervention and empire, has not attracted the attention it warrants. It is particularly surprising that Mill has been largely overlooked by the English School, whose members acutely appreciate the contributions of classical political philosophers to international discourse. Galvanised by his introspection on his life, especially the impact of interference in his psychological and intellectual development, to his analysis of the impact of Britain on India's princely states and intervention in civil wars, Mill identified timeless problems intrinsic to international relations whilst profoundly appreciating the tensions they generated in the form of perverse effects, unintended consequences and moral hazard. Contemporary international relations are replete with examples of the unforeseen and unforeseeable developments that attend intervention and interference. If a concern of the English School is the tormenting decisions that fall to statesmen, Mill provides an understanding of the considerations that vastly complicate such decisions.     

Fiscal Institutions,Credit Ratings,and Borrowing Costs

This paper investigates the impact of fiscal institutions on state government borrowing costs. We find that institutions have both a direct and indirect effect on interest costs paid by state governments. Revenue limits are associated directly with higher interest costs; expenditure limits, stricter balanced budget rules, and restrictions on state debt issuance are indirectly associated with lower interest costs because they lead to higher credit ratings. It appears that investors and bond raters incorporate information on fiscal institutions into their assessment of state government credit quality.     

Bureaucrats–Enterprise Negotiation in China's Enterprise Reform at the Local Level: case studies in Guangzhou

This article explores the implementation of SOE reform in China at the local level, using case studies in Guangzhou as illustration. It is argued that local government spearheads a reform agenda that puts locally-defined state objectives first, not necessarily favouring enterprise restructuring. A full-fledged negotiation model does not exist in SOE reforms because all enterprises are controlled by the state and have to comply with top-down policies and orders. Government-enterprise relations and the degree of entrepreneurial power depend largely on the economic strength of the enterprise, with the boomers getting a good economic bargain while the laggards fail to gain sympathy from government. Enterprise workers are largely at the mercy of restructuring decisions that come from bargaining and at times collusion between managers and local bureaucrats.