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551.
We leverage the institutional features of American courts to evaluate the importance of whistleblowers in hierarchical oversight. Drawing on a formal theory of signaling in the judicial hierarchy, we examine the role of whistleblowing dissents in triggering en banc review of three‐judge panels by full circuits of the Courts of Appeals. The theory generates predictions about how dissent interacts with judicial preferences to influence circuits' review and reversal decisions, which we test using original and existing data. First, we show that judges who dissent counter to their preferences are more likely to see their dissents lead to review and reversal. Second, we show that dissents are most influential when the likelihood of non‐compliance by a three‐judge panel is highest. Our results underscore the importance of dissent in the judicial hierarchy and illustrate how judicial whistleblowers can help appellate courts target the most important cases for review.  相似文献   
552.
One way that principals can overcome the problem of informational asymmetries in hierarchical organizations is to enable whistleblowing. We evaluate how whistleblowing influences compliance in the judicial hierarchy. We present a formal model in which a potential whistleblower may, at some cost, signal noncompliance by a lower court to a higher court. A key insight of the model is that whistleblowing is most informative when it is rare. While the presence of a whistleblower can increase compliance by lower courts, beyond a certain point blowing the whistle is counterproductive and actually reduces compliance. Moreover, a whistleblower who is a “perfect ally” of the higher court (in terms of preferences) blows the whistle too often. Our model shows an important connection between the frequency of whistleblowing and the effectiveness of whistleblowing as a threat to induce compliance in hierarchical organizations.  相似文献   
553.
This study examined the impact of prior personal or vicarious experience with the criminal justice system on sentencing attitudes. Existing research on sentencing attitudes has examined factors such as race, gender, income level, political affiliation, and education level, but few research studies have focused on actual contact with the criminal justice system and its influence on perceptions of sentencing as either too harsh or too lenient. The current study utilized data collected by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. Over 1,500 respondents were surveyed nationwide in 2006 regarding sentencing attitudes. Logistic regression analysis was utilized to assess the impact of factors of interest on sentencing attitudes. Results indicated that individuals who had been charged with a crime (personal experience), or who had an immediate relative or close friend who had been charged (vicarious experience), were more likely to perceive the criminal justice system as too harsh, regardless of race/ethnicity.  相似文献   
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