The COLLECTORS ranking scale for ‘at‐scene’ digital device triage

As digital evidence now features prominently in many criminal investigations, such large volumes of requests for the forensic examination of devices has led to well publicized backlogs and delays. In an effort to cope, triage policies are frequently implemented in order to reduce the number of digital devices which are seized unnecessarily. Often first responders are tasked with performing triage at scene in order to decide whether any identified devices should be seized and submitted for forensic examination. In some cases, this is done with the assistance of software which allows device content to be “previewed”; however, in some cases, a first responder will triage devices using their judgment and experience alone, absent of knowledge of the devices content, referred to as “decision‐based device triage” (DBDT). This work provides a discussion of the challenges first responders face when carrying out DBDT at scene. In response, the COLLECTORS ranking scale is proposed to help first responders carry out DBDT and to formalize this process in an effort to support quality control of this practice. The COLLECTORS ranking scale consists of 10 categories which first responders should rank a given device against. Each devices cumulative score should be queried against the defined “seizure thresholds” which offer support to first responders in assessing when to seize a device. To offer clarify, an example use‐case involving the COLLECTORS ranking scale is included, highlighting its application when faced with multiple digital devices at scene.     

Visualization of latent fingerprints using fluorescence lifetime imaging on paper emitting strong fluorescence

Latent fingerprints were successfully visualized using fluorescence lifetime imaging (FLIM) on paper which emits strong fluorescence with a lifetime close to that of fingerprints and thus from which it is difficult for time-resolved spectroscopy to visualize fingerprints. Latent fingerprint samples on paper were excited using a 450 nm or 532 nm nanosecond pulsed-laser, and time-resolved fluorescence images were obtained at a delay time of 6–16 ns in intervals of 1 ns, to the excitation pulse. The excitation beam was expanded using a lens, and the fluorescence from the fingerprints was captured using an intensified CCD camera. Because of the large fluorescence intensity of the background paper of approximately two to four orders of magnitude larger than that of the fingerprint, the fingerprint was not visualized on each fluorescence image by time-resolved spectroscopy. However, the fingerprint was visualized in a FLIM image constructed using a series of the fluorescence images for the case with the fluorescence intensity of the background paper being four orders of magnitude larger than that of the fingerprint. The difference in fluorescence lifetime in the FLIM image of the visualized fingerprint and background paper was in the order of 0.1 ns, which was an order of magnitude smaller than the inherent fluorescence lifetime of a few nanoseconds for the fingerprints and paper. It was demonstrated that, at a background fluorescence intensity with a certain order of magnitude larger than that of fingerprints, FLIM has the potential to visualize latent fingerprints which cannot be visualized by time-resolved spectroscopy.     

Collapse at the WTO: a Cancun post‐mortem

This article offers an analysis of the collapse of the WTO talks in Cancun in September 2003. It argues that the collapse of the talks should not be regarded as a victory for the developing world, as many have suggested. Rather, the collapse should be seen as the inevitable result of deep‐seated tensions within the wto 's institutional framework, both in terms of the processes that underlie its working and the substance of its agreements. The article argues that these imbalances, if not corrected, will heighten the alienation of developing countries and work to the detriment of the legitimacy and survival of the wto.     

The Poverty of the Doha Round and the Least Developed Countries

Two distinct literatures have emerged on the World Trade Organization's Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and its likely benefits for developing countries. One is built on the use of computable general and partial equilibrium simulations, while another explores the political economy of the negotiation process to explore the opportunities a concluded round will bring for developing countries. Both literatures generate important insights into the DDA, and both highlight that the deal on offer to developing countries is very weak. However, there has been little engagement between these two bodies of thought. This paper seeks to begin to redress this, fusing a review of the simulations of likely DDA gains with an examination of the passage of the Doha negotiations. It argues that through this process we can arrive at a fuller understanding of how limited, and problematic, the results of the DDA are likely to be for the less developed countries. If the DDA is to deliver on its mandate, a qualitative shift in the negotiations is required.     

State rules: Oil companies and armed conflict in Sudan

The strategic behaviour of international oil companies in war-torn Sudan was overwhelmingly driven by political pressure from governments. After almost 20 years of operating in Sudan, the US giant Chevron was pushed to withdraw as a result of deteriorating relations between Washington and Khartoum. The Canadian flagship oil company, Talisman, which helped kick-start oil development after Chevron's exit also fell victim to Washington's ire. On the other hand, the European junior oil companies, Lundin and omv, protected by the European Union's political standpoint of ‘constructive engagement’ in Sudan, were free to profit. Finally, the eastern parastatals, led by a surging China, eager to capture international energy resources to fuel their budding economies and supported by the plural relationships fostered between their respective governments and the ruling, riverine elite in Khartoum, tactfully established a dominating presence. While fervent international human rights advocacy alone seemingly drove susceptible Western firms out of Sudan, the real power behind corporate movements came from the rules dictated by states.     

Party Size and Portfolio Payoffs: The Proportional Allocation of Ministerial Posts in Coalition Governments

Over 30 years ago, Eric Browne and Mark Franklin demonstrated that parties in a coalition tend to receive portfolio payoffs in almost perfect proportionality to their seat share. Even though this result has been confirmed in several studies, few researchers have asked what the underlying mechanism is that explains why parties receive a proportional payoff. The aim of this paper is to investigate the causal mechanism linking party size and portfolio payoffs. To fulfil this aim, a small-n analysis is performed. By analysing the predictions from a statistical analysis of all post-war coalition governments in 14 Western European countries, two predicted cases are selected, the coalitions that formed after the 1976 Swedish election and the 1994 German election. In these case studies two hypotheses are evaluated: that the proportional distribution of ministerial posts is the result of a social norm, and that parties obtain payoffs according to their bargaining strength. The results give no support to the social norm hypothesis. Instead, it is suggested that proportionality serves as a bargaining convention for the actors involved, thus rendering proportional payoffs more likely.     

The Electoral Connection and Legislative Committees

This article examines whether the career needs of legislators – to be re-elected or to move on to another political post – allow us to explain the rules governing committee structures and the committee assignments individual legislators obtain. It uses the institutional variations provided by Argentina, Costa Rica, and Venezuela to test hypotheses about committee assignments and committee assignment mechanisms. It finds that incentives created by candidate selection procedures and electoral rules show some relationship to committee assignments, but with a good deal of variation across national cases and individual careers.