Analyzing linked systems of negotiations

This article presents a conceptual framework for analyzing the structure and dynamics of what the authors call linked systems of negotiations. Even such seemingly straightforward transactions as the purchase of a family car tend to involve linked negotiations. The framework highlights the importance of internegotiation processes in shaping Zones of Possible Agreement, and proposes a typology of linkage. By mapping out and reengineering linked systems, negotiators can enhance their ability to shape the structure within which their negotiations take place.     

Circumventing formal structure through commitment: Presidential influence and agenda control

Although the formal institutional structure that defines the temporal order of play in a policy game between the Congress and President ought to provide Congress with agenda power, the President is traditionally treated as the dominant player in this relationship. We show that if the President can make clear-cut commitments, presidential commitment can counter the dominance hierarchy and the complexion of equilibrium outcomes. Thus, the details of political interactions (in particular, the possibilities for commitment) may be as important as the formal specification of institutional structure.We thank Peter Aranson, David Austen-Smith, Ed Campos, Gerry Faulhaber, Art Frank, Ken Koford, William Riker, Janet Pack, the anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the University of Delaware, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Rochester for helpful comments, subject to the usual caveat. We also thank Joel Friedlander and Harold Dichter for research assistance.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Sheldon S. Wolin:</Emphasis> Tocqueville between two worlds: The making of a political and theoretical life

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Sheldon S. Wolin: Tocqueville between two worlds: The making of a political and theoretical life Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press 2001, 650 S., $ 24,95