What Determines Judicial Prestige? An Empirical Analysis for Judges of the Federal Court of Australia

This article examines judicial citations to analyze the determinantsof judicial prestige in the Federal Court of Australia. Firstwe construct two alternative measures of judicial prestige forall current and retired judges of the Federal Court. Second,we regress these measures of judicial prestige on a series ofexplanatory variables covering age on appointment, appointinggovernment, prior experience, which law school the judge attended,how many law review articles the judge has published, gender,and tenure. We compare our results with those of previous studiesthat examine the determinants of judicial influence and prestigein courts in the United States and the High Court of Australia.One of the main contributions of the article is to provide evidencefrom an intermediate appellate court that can be used to testthe general application of findings as to what determines judicialprestige in the United States to courts in other countries withdifferent institutional frameworks.     

More Can Be Less: Hyper Plurality of Candidates,the Rationality of Electoral Choice,and Need for Electoral Reform in India

A large number of candidates has become a regular feature of Indian elections. Given the regulatory concerns the problem has evoked, this article reviews the process of candidate entry in select developed countries. The review reveals the presence of diverse approaches, ruling out the necessity for extreme options like debarring fringe candidates—a course suggested by several Indian expert groups. Among various policy options, India had largely relied on electoral deposit. Our results suggest that an increase in deposits had a significant negative impact on candidate entry in India. However, for an effective deterrence, India needs to continue to keep deposits at a very high level compared to the current international benchmark, discriminating political participation of genuinely underprivileged groups. In contrast, the current level of signature requirements, a relatively unused policy tool in India, was found to be too low and could be easily increased further in order to be effective. We argue that given the high variation and lack of stability in candidate structure across regions and over time, a local approach on signature requirements—as in the U.S. —could be an effective deterrent in India. Accordingly, we suggest that the Election Commission of India should not only have the power to determine the deposit before each election; it should also have the power to change the minimum signature requirement across constituencies (subject to some standard checks and balances).