Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive–legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade‐off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis‐à‐vis the legislature.     

Democratization and women’s representation in presidential cabinets: evidence from East and Southeast Asia

This article examines patterns of women’s cabinet representation across all presidential democracies in East and Southeast Asia since democratization. It demonstrates how the choice of female ministers differs across career backgrounds in presidential systems and further examines why young presidential systems in Asia are conducive to women’s access to ministerial power through professional career tracks. We argue that despite women’s successful performance in national legislative elections, women have been restricted to access the power resources necessary to target other political goals, such as cabinet positions, whereas democratic transition has provided broader avenues for women to emerge as professionals outside party politics. By analyzing original data on female ministers in East and Southeast Asia, the study finds that the share of women among professional ministers has increased over time, but women’s share among political ministers has not changed significantly. Additionally, the different qualifications of female politicians and professionals also make them eligible for appointment to different types of policy areas in terms of prestige and gender. Our analysis suggests that women’s cabinet representation has improved overall since democratic transition in Asia, but this improvement disguises contrasting outcomes in women’s cabinet status according to their career backgrounds.     

Non‐tariff measures and United States' imports of CBERA‐eligible products

Trade coverage ratios are calculated to assess the 1991 incidence of non‐tariff measures (NTMs) on imports of products eligible for duty‐free treatment under the United States’ Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). Overall, 16 per cent of all CBERA‐eligible products were found to be covered by one or more NTM. Corresponding figures for all eligible products exported from individual beneficiaries range up to 40 per cent. Much higher trade coverage ratios are found for individual product groups. NTMs constitute important deterrents to US imports of CBERA‐eligible products. Heavy reliance on NTMs counters the intent of the CBERA, namely to extend preferential treatment to exports from Caribbean Basin countries.     

Warriors in the “new world order”

He writes regularly on matters of strategy. His publications include The Strategic Dimension of Military Manpower;and Paradoxes of Power: The Military Establishment in the Eighties.     

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Implementation of an Administrative Remedy

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is an administrative remedythat has not been fully enforced to protect the voting rightsof minority citizens in those jurisdictions covered by the VRA.Failure to enforce Section 5 fully is the result of: (I) thestructure of the Section 5 review process, (2) the poor qualityof data received by the U.S. Department of Justice, and (3)the cursory analysis of data by the Equal Opportunity Specialists.What is needed to strengthen Section 5 enforcement is a strongpresidential commitment to protect the interests of minorityvoters. Reform of the Section 5 review process can only takeplace if the president places voting rights enforcement highon his political agenda.