Techniques and processes of administration

Abstract. Since the Glassco Commission in the early sixties there has been a plethora of administrative changes: Program Planning and Budgeting, Operational Performance Measurement Systems, Management by Objectives, and Cost/Benefit Analysis have all been introduced as technical panaceas. In terms of processes, some should probably have been changed but remain the same(such as the personnel selection-promotion process), while others have been circumvented (the regular budgetary process). Still others have been changed (the cabinet committee process) but have produced results of questionable value and perhaps positive harm to majority governments. It is contended that the Glassco injunction ‘let the manager manage’ and the assumption that private sector practices should be adopted by government, virtually without modification, ignore fundamental differences between the two sectors. The war between competing interest groups is inevitable and hence perpetual. Governments engage in a rolling set of compromises between factions in an essentially adversarial process under rules, formal and informal, that restrict the field of battle. Frequently, those who advocate administrative changes are in pursuit of their personal interests. They frequently find themselves in alliances with one or more of the contending parties who look upon them as guns for hire to be used or rejected on strategic grounds. After an impressionistic critique of each of the processes and techniques previously cited, the paper ends on a more positive note. There is a plea that the powers of the auditor general be expanded to encompass reporting upon (as distinct from undertaking) the extent to which a ministry is carrying out efficiency and effectiveness studies, where there is a consensus about the validity of the data and methodology. It is also suggested that the auditor general report upon the disposition of these studies with the aim of breaking down present secrecy barriers. A better informed public would change the incentive structure within which ministers, aided by officials, reach their decisions. Sommaire. Depuis la Commission Glasscoe, au début des années 60, il y a eu une pléthore de changements administratifs. La Planification et l'établissement des budgets par programme, les systèmes de mesure des performances opérationnelles, la gestion en function des objectifs, l'analyse des coûts et avantages, tous ces systèmes ont été utilisés comme panacées techniques. Du point de vue des processus, certains, qui auraient dû sans doute être changés ne l'ont pas été (comme par exemple la sélection du personnel et le processus de l'avancement) alors que d'autres ont été contournés (le processus budgétaire normal). D'autres encore ont été changEeAs (le processus des comités de cabinet) mais pour produire des résultats de valeur douteuse et parfois franchement défavorables pour les gouvernements majoritaires. L'auteur soutient que l'impératif de la Commission Glasscoe « laisser gérer les gestionnaires » et le postulat suivant lequel les pratiques du secteur privé devraien être adoptées pratiquement sans modification par les gouvernements ignorent les différences fondamentales qui existent entre les deux secteurs. La lutte entre des groupes aux intérêts divergents est inévitable, et done perpétuelle. Les gouvernements s'engagent dans tout un jeu de compromis dynamiques entre les différentes factions dans ce qui essentiellement un processus antagoniste, à l'intérieur de règies formelles ou non formelles, qui réduisent la portée du conflit. Fréquemment, ceux qui réclament des changements administratifs le font dans leur propre intérêt et ils se trouvent souvent alliés à un ou plusueurs des partis d'opposition qui les considèrent comme des mercenaires à utiliser ou rejeter pour des raisons stratégiques. Après une critique subjective des divers processus et techniques cités précédemment, l'auteur conclut sur une note plus positive. Il demande que les pouvoirs de l'Auditeur général soient étendus pour qu'il fasse connaître (et non pas pour qu'il étudie) la mesure dans laquelle les ministères effectuent des études sur l'efficience et l'efficacité, là où il existe un consensus quant à la validité des données et de la méthodologie. Il propose aussi que l'Auditeur général fasse rapport sur l'usage qui est fait de ces études, afin de supprimer le secret qui l'entoure actuellement. Un public mieux informé transformerait la structure de la motivation qui entoure actuellement les ministres qui prennent des decisions et leurs fonctionnaires.     

Voting May Be Habit-Forming: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment

Habit is a frequently mentioned but understudied cause of political action. This article provides the first direct test of the hypothesis that casting a ballot in one election increases one's propensity to go to the polls in the future. A field experiment involving 25,200 registered voters was conducted prior to the November general election of 1998. Subjects were randomly assigned to treatment conditions in which they were urged to vote through direct mail or face-to-face canvassing. Compared to a control group that received no contact, the treatment groups were significantly more likely to vote in 1998. The treatment groups were also significantly more likely to vote in local elections held in November of 1999. After deriving a statistical estimator to isolate the effect of habit, we find that, ceteris paribus, voting in one election substantially increases the likelihood of voting in the future. Indeed, the influence of past voting exceeds the effects of age and education reported in previous studies.     

Testing the Buchanan-Wagner Hypothesis: European Evidence from Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests

According to the Buchanan-Wagnerhypothesis, public deficits reduce theperceived price of public goods to thecurrent generation of voters who, in turn,increase the demands for such socialservices. Several recent studies haveattempted to test this proposition. In thispaper, we apply modern time seriestechniques organized around panel unit rootand panel cointegration to draw sharperconclusions from the short time series thatare typically available. We find that thereis a long run positive relationship betweengovernment spending and government deficitsfor each country individually, as well asfor the panel as a whole. This providessupport for the BW hypothesis. We alsoanalyze the implications for the relativeproductivity performance of the public andprivate sector, the existence of scaleeconomies in the provision of publicservices, as well as the extent of crowdingout effects.     

The Size and Significance of the Pareto Set in Spatial Voting Models

The size of the Pareto set in the issue space of spatialvoting models is a function of the tax prices that voters arecharged. When all voters pay Lindahl prices for all goods, thePareto set collapses to a single point. The Pareto set can beenlarged by altering tax shares so they are further fromLindahl prices, and can be reduced by moving toward Lindahlpricing. A smaller Pareto set moves voters closer to consensuson issues, so reduces political decisionmaking costs and makesthe political system more stable.     

The Imprisonment Crisis in America: Introduction

This article provides an overview of recent trends in imprisonment rates in America and introduces the articles in this issue of The Review of Policy Research. Incarceration rates have increased by more than 500 percent since the early 1970s and have now reached a rate of almost 700, higher than anywhere else in the world. The impact has been particularly hard on racial minorities, especially women (whose incarceration rate went from around 8 in 1975 to 59 in 2001). The “war on drugs” has been one of the main reasons behind the increases in imprisonment, along with the more general “get tough on crime” movement that began in the late 1970s. The articles in this issue center around how this recent trend in incarceration impacts the entire society, but especially poor communities. Several of the articles focus on race, age and gender as important variables, in addition to the tendency of the parole system to sort of “recycle” released prisoners back into the prison system.     

The alternative vote and interethnic moderation: A reply to Fraenkel and Grofman

The alternative vote (AV) is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise. Fraenkel and Grofman have modeled the likely effects of AV in severely divided societies, in order to impugn AV as a tool of interethnic accommodation. In this response, I show that Fraenkel and Grofman’s model is based on extreme assumptions that bear no relation to party and voter behavior in such societies. Models based on realistic assumptions about strategic behavior and cross-national experience with AV both demonstrate that AV generally provides centripetal incentives that can contribute to interethnic coalition-building and accommodation.     

Under Two Flags: Symbolic Voting in the State of Mississippi

Participants in a specialelection held in the State of Mississippion April 17, 2001, voted overwhelminglyagainst changing the design of the state'sflag, which incorporates a symbol of theConfederacy. The determinants of voting onthe flag are analyzed and turnout rates inApril 2001 are compared with those forrecent gubernatorial and presidentialelections. We find that the flag votedivided Mississippians sharply along linesof race, class and political ideology. Akey empirical implication is that voterpositions in issue space tend to be morepolarized when political choices haveexpressive as opposed to instrumentalconsequences.     

经行政程序处理完的事情，当事人能否请求司法救济

请求司法救济是公民、法人运用法律武器保护自己合法权益的手段,但在司法实践中有些当事人不能正确运用法律武器保护自己的权利,且将行政程序处理完的事情请求司法救济。本文作者从几个方面分析了该案当事人的脱法行为,阐述了行政程序与法律程序在该案中适用范围及一事不再理原则在实践中的运用。