Responsible Government and Capitalism’s Cycles

This article explores the tensions Peter Mair identified between responsible and responsive government in relation to the constraints and opportunities of an internationally integrated and instituted economy. Drawing on the example of the short period of democratic stability and its subsequent breakdown in the Weimar Republic, the article argues that in Weimar Germany’s ‘golden twenties’, governments could bridge the gap between responsibility – defined as a commitment to deep international integration – and responsiveness to its citizens mainly through the availability of cheap credits. With the onset of the Great Depression, responsible government became tantamount to increasingly drastic austerity policies. These policies were not only an economic failure, they also made the gap between responsible and responsive government unbridgeable. The article also shows how a similar cycle of good and bad times, with similar consequences with regard to the tensions between responsible and responsive government seem to have occurred in the crisis that has been affecting the Eurozone since 2009.     

Symbolic Citizenship,Nationalism and the Distant State: The United States Congress in the 1996 Debate on Immigration Reform

Using a framework which is based on T. H. Marshall's Citizenship and Social Class , the article analyzes concepts of citizenship as they emerged in the 1996 debates of the United States Congress which resulted in the passage of important welfare and immigration reform laws. The discussions revealed that a majority of congressional politicians supported a citizenship ideal that relied primarily on an individuals' status as taxpayer, worker and member of a nuclear family and remained relatively distant to the nation state. The legislation passed as a result of these debates represents the attempt to use state power to maintain immigrants' distance from the state.     

Taking a second look at Germany's motivation to establish economic and monetary union: A critique of ‘economic interests’ claims

One of the most widespread explanations of Germany's willingness to create European monetary union is that business or economic interest groups supported and lobbied for it, believing it would be good for them. This article refutes the argument that economic interests were actively involved in the process or that they had a causal impact on the German government's acceptance of EMU. Empirical evidence shows that economic interest groups in Germany were hesitant and sceptical about monetary union, especially since the EMS was working well. Economic interests belatedly mimicked the demands of the Bundesbank that EMU be insulated from political pressure and that price stability be enshrined in the charter, but they did not urge the government to join. Moreover, the members of peak business organisations were themselves divided on the merits of EMU. Thus, this article falsifies the claim that business or economic interests were the driving force behind Kohl's willingness to give up the DM.