Righting the Resource Curse: Institutional Politics and State Capabilities in Edo State,Nigeria

Abstract

The poor record of liberal reforms sponsored by the international community in postcolonial settings underscores the real politik of institutional change. What we call a ‘new normal’ in development policy and practice foregrounds the role of agency – leadership, networks of connectors and convenors, entrepreneurs and activists – but it has less to say about the political and economic conditions of possibility in which agents operate. The putative powers of agency seem most challenged in contexts of extreme resource dependency and the resource curse. The particular case of Edo, a state in the oil rich Niger delta region of Nigeria, illustrates the intersection of agency and structural conditions to show how ‘asymmetric capabilities’ can emerge to create, constrain and make possible particular reform options.     

The role of compensation in siting hazardous facilities

Empirical evidence indicates that compensation can prove effective in gaining public acceptance for siting facilities on the benign end of the spectrum (e.g., landfills, prisons), but is subject to serious limitations when it comes to facilities that the public regards as particularly risky or of questionable legitimacy such as nuclear waste repositories. These facilities require creative mitigation measures such as independent inspections of the facility and local shutdown power. Even then they may be viewed as too risky to be acceptable with or without compensation. This article proposes a two-stage siting process which recognizes the importance of regulations and safety standards (Stage 1) while employing a voluntary process with compensation to address concerns with equity and efficiency (Stage 2).     

An insight into forensic document examiner expertise for discriminating between forged and disguised signatures

It has previously been shown that forensic document examiners (FDEs) have expertise in providing opinions about whether questioned signatures are genuine or simulated. This study extends the exploration of FDE expertise by evaluating the performance of eight FDEs and 12 control subjects at identifying signatures as either forgeries or the disguised writing of a specimen provider. Subject eye movements and response times were recorded with a Tobii 1750 eye tracker during the signature evaluations. Using a penalty scoring system, FDEs performed significantly better than control subjects (t = 2.465, p = 0.024), with one FDE able to correctly call 13 of the 16 test stimuli (and three inconclusive calls). An analysis of eye movement search patterns by the subjects indicated that a very similar search strategy was employed by both groups, suggesting that visual inspection of signatures is mediated by a bottom up search strategy. However, FDEs spent greater than 50% longer to make a decision than the control group. The findings are suggestive that for some stimuli FDEs can discriminate between forgeries and disguises, and that this ability is due to a careful inspection and consideration of multiple features within a signature.     

SOCIAL PROGRAM INNOVATION AND DISSEMINATION: A STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE PROCESSES

The dissemination of social program innovations that have been demonstrated to be effective through rigorous evaluation is an important issue. The classical dissemination framework emphasizes the position that programs implemented with fidelity to the original model are most likely to produce the positive outcomes demonstrated in the model's evaluation phase. However, critics suggest that local programs that are extensively modified are more likely to meet local goals and, therefore, are more likely to be sustained within the organization. The present research examined the implementation, effectiveness, and routinization of seven innovations replicated in a nationwide sample of organizations. The innovations were diverse in both content and implementing context and were located in a variety of sites, including schools, courts, prisons, police departments, and social service agencies. The results suggest that the innovations were replicated with acceptable levels of fidelity to the disseminated program models, and that higher-fidelity implementations tended to be more effective than those implemented with lower fidelity. The implications of the findings for social program dissemination policy are discussed and the authors propose an expansion of Berman's contingency model of innovation dissemination.     

Vertrag über Stabilit?t, Koordinierung und Steuerung in der WWU und Europ?ischer Stabilit?tsmechanismus

Anfang Februar 2012 unterzeichneten die 17 Euro-Staaten den Vertrag über die Einrichtung eines permanenten Europ?ischen Stabilit?tsmechanismus ("ESM-Vertrag"). Einen Monat sp?ter wurde von 25 der 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten der Vertrag über Stabilit?t, Koordinierung und Steuerung in der Wirtschafts- und W?hrungsunion ("VSKS") zum Abschluss gebracht. Beide Vertr?ge sind Teil des Krisenbew?ltigungsprogramms in der Union, stehen aber au?erhalb des EU-Vertragswerks. Aufgrund der Ausgestaltung als rein zwischenstaatliche Vereinbarungen werfen die beiden Vertr?ge hinsichtlich ihres Verh?ltnisses zu und ihrer Vereinbarkeit mit dem Recht der Europ?ischen Union einige interessante Fragen auf, die der vorliegende Beitrag n?her untersuchen will.