Die Kolonien in Europa

Ohne Zusammenfassung

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Reformfähigkeit messen? Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zu einem Reformfähigkeitsindex für OECD-Staaten

In the present article, I propose to determine reform capacity based upon policy outcomes and the governing performance of executives. Both components shall be measured through expert assessments and quantitative data for the 30 OECD member states in order to construct an index of reform capacity. The concepts underpinning the index are explained and compared with existing approaches of performance and governance measurement. Criteria are developed to assess the strategic capacity of governments and the accountability-generating functions of political actors surrounding the government. The envisaged measurement and aggregation methods are described and the potential of the proposed approach is discussed.     

Die Zurechnung Dritter nach § 875 ABGB

Willensm?ngel, die nicht auf den Vertragspartner des Irrenden bzw Bedrohten, sondern einen Dritten zurückzuführen sind, k?nnen gem § 875 ABGB nur ausnahmsweise releviert werden. Dieser Beitrag untersucht in seinem ersten Teil die in Rsp und Lehre nur wenig behandelten Zurechnungskriterien des § 875 ABGB. Der zweite Teil rollt die Frage neu auf, ob die vors?tzliche Entstellung einer Erkl?rung durch den Erkl?rungsboten die Zurechnung zum Gesch?ftsherrn verhindert. Auch dafür spielt § 875 ABGB eine entscheidende Rolle.     

Does collusive advertising facilitate collusive pricing? Evidence from experimental duopolies

This article analyzes experimentally whether the degree of collusion for one dimension of duopolists?? interactions influences the degree of collusion for another dimension. More precisely, I will explore whether a high degree of collusion for advertisement expenditures facilitates tacit price collusion. Two environments are tested, in which the size of the spillover between advertising expenditures is varied. The results indicate that both degrees of collusion are correlated: a high degree of collusion on advertising functions as a signalling device triggering a significantly higher degree of price collusion by the opponent. Thus advertising expenditures seem to be a useful indicator for market regulators to detect non-competitive pricing.