Co-optation,competition and resistance: mediation and divorce professionals in Israel

This paper investigates the development of family mediation in Israel within the theoretical framework of the competition between professions (Abbott, 1988; Shamir, 1993), and the co-optation model of Coy and Hedeen (2005). It describes the formal institutionalization of family mediation in Israel and examines the claims made by lawyers, therapeutic mediators, and lawyer-mediators about the nature and boundaries of their professional enterprise and their goals and practices. Based on 254 questionnaires, semi-structured taped interviews and professional documents, our study found differences in the way the professionals construct the nature of the competition over mediation. While lawyers describe mediators as invading their realm of divorce practice, therapeutic professionals view mediation as a new field of knowledge which they are claiming as their own, in competition with legal professionals. Moreover, although elements of Coy and Hedeen's (2005) co-optation model were useful in describing the developing relationship between the divorce professionals, we found different strategies of resistance at each stage of the process.     

Reconstruction and reconciliation: Emerging from transition

I wish first to address some of the simplistic myths about solutions to social conflict, and then reflect on problems that I have experienced with aid efforts organised by the international community, through the UN. In this, I shall focus on Bosnia rather than on Africa. Bosnia, as part of Europe, did not suffer the apathy that characterised international responses to events in Rwanda and Burundi before 1994. The second part of my presentation will address what I see as the flawed assumptions that often underlie the emphasis on economic reconstruction in the wake of war and conflict.     

Die „Kartellparteien“-These und ihre Kritiker

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Peter Nitschke: Einführung in die Politische Theorie der Prämoderne 1500–1800

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Regieren unter den Bedingungen des institutionellen Pluralismus: ein deutsch-amerikanischer Vergleich

Within the discipline of comparative politics, Western democracies have been categorized according to the number of veto-players or ‘co-governing actors’ governments face when pursuing their programmes. Often, potential veto-players have been treated as rather static factors with a focus on their maximum veto potential. In this article, devoted to studying the conditions of governing in the United States and Germany, veto-players are explicitly considered as dynamic actors, which allows much more realistic assessments of the conditions of governing in highly power-sharing systems. In fact, under certain conditions some veto-players may ease rather than complicate the task of governing. Moreover, the fundamental difference between parliamentarism and presidentialism is being highligthed as a key variable shaping the functioning of seemingly similar institutional arrangements in liberal democracies.