The earnings test and the short-run work response to its elimination

Eliminating the earnings test will have different effects on the work effort of persons aged 65-69, depending on whether or not they are currently working or currently receiving Social Security benefits. This article reviews the development of the earnings test and examines the theoretical implications on work effort of removing the test for members of this age group. It looks at the Current Population Survey (CPS) data to determine how many persons aged 65-69 have characteristics that can be identified with groups that would theoretically increase, decrease, or not change their work effort should they no longer be subject to the earnings test. This analysis suggests that at least 80 percent, and perhaps more than 90 percent, of the 9.7 million persons aged 65-69 will not change their level of work effort if the earnings test is eliminated. Individuals who would modify their hours worked and earnings are fairly evenly split among those who would increase, decrease, or have an undetermined direction of change in their work effort.     

'The Form Most Eligible': Liberty in the Constitutional Convention

Although the framers of the U.S. Constitution agreed that thefirst principles stated by the Declaration of Independence werefundamental, they thought that the form which freedom shouldtake within the Constitution could not be discovered by a resortto natural rights (and thus declined to affix a bill of rightsto the Constitution). They rejected both the view that libertyis independence (whether of individuals or of states) and theview that liberty is equivalent to the rule of the people. Instead,they held a political view of freedom in which liberty is understoodas the scope men have for political action. The institutionsthey designed direct the use of liberty to the common good.In light of this analysis, the issue of whether the Constitution'sprovisions concerning slavery and its treatment of women areindications of an inadequate view of liberty can be answeredin the negative.     

The economic approach to political behavior: Governors,bureaucrats, and cost commissions

Cost control commissions provide two primary types of recommendations: widespread benefits-widespread costs and widespread benefits-narrow costs. Both types of recommendations are not of the form predicted by the standard economic models of political behavior. The paper explores why governors sanction these commissions and the types of recommendations governors will accept. Legislators use the maxim of concentrate benefits-spread costs to maximize votes. Governors, however, face a lower return to concentrated benefit policies and a lower cost from concentrated cost policies. This leads a governor to favor at the margin, policies which have widespread benefit-widespread cost or widespread benefit-concentrated cost. Evidence from 5 state cost control commissions support the difference between the politicians. The cost control commissions sanctioned by governors have proposed recommendations of the widespread benefit-widespread cost and widespread benefit-concentrated cost form. Governors accepted approximately two-thirds of the widespread benefit-concentrated cost proposals, although they were more likely to accept recommendations of the widespread benefit-widespread cost nature. Recommendations which required legislative approval saw a lower likelihood of acceptance. This is consistent with the view that legislators prefer concentrated to widespread benefit recommendations. qu][The politician's] favorite strategy is to create a commission to study a problem and make recommendations that may then be used as political cover. Call it government by commission.     

On democracy and debt

As we explained there is really little a priori reasoning for a clear prediction that authoritarian regimes will incur more foreign debt. In fact, some other empirical literature reveals that such regimes will face a higher supply price for such debt. Anderson presents a study of a single year using an admittedly crude measure of authoritarianism that finds that such regimes do issue more debt.This study provides a fuller examination of the empirical relationship between foreign debt and the nature of the polity's regime. Utilizing a continuous democracy variable and a continuous political liberty variable, it tests the relationship between debt and political variables. It finds little empirical support for the thesis that democracy or autocracy influence foreign debt levels. Generally the continuous variables are not significant if we use a linear in the logs specification. While a linear specification obtains results more consistent with the idea that level of democracy decreases debt, it also obtains results even less favorable to the idea that extreme forms of autocracy increase debt.     

PREDICTORS OF ELECTORAL TURNOUT: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON*

Voter turnout in the United States is much lower than in almost all other democratic countries. This has been interpreted as a symptom of popular alienation from the political system, suspicion of politicians, and pessimism about the consequences of political activity. When these perspectives are measured directly, however, it is clear that Americans score very low on almost every item. Indeed, there is no relationship between political con- tentment and turnout. Turnout does not reflect international variations in acceptance of politicians or the political system. Rather, it responds to variations in the bureaucratic steps required to cast a ballot. The United States is one of a handful of countries that require a separate step–registra- tion–before the citizen can vote; and with the partial exception of France it is the only country in which the individual rather than the state bears the responsibility for registration.