An Elected Upper House and Other Fallacies

All fashionable political talk is of an elected House of Lords. Doing this smart, new unthought‐out thing, says Edward Pearce, means dissolving the reliably rebellious upper house regularly rejecting bad bills from Tory and Labour governments, for a House as submissive as the Commons. Second‐line politicians will replace the difficult individual people, soldiers, doctors, academics, scientists, assorted and distinguished experts who, by lucky muddle, go there today. Far better, he says, to abolish actual titles which create a false idea of privilege, but continue drawing upon independent professional specialists. Also, Ministers should be barred from the pernicious Mandelson Effect, of making an instant Minister by life‐ennoblement, huge powers conferred without a voter in sight. An upper house called ‘The Upper House’, chosen as now for competence, will be a House of Commoners, of Independence, of Contradiction. Elected Party‐liners under guidance would be a House of Sheep.     

Legal Needs of The Poor: Problems,Priorities and Attitudes*

The Legal Services Corporation is faced with the problem of allocating limited resources in order to meet the legal needs of the poor. It is forced into the dilemma of setting priorities, creating workable regulations to meet an ambiguously defined and elusive concept of legal need. Recently enacted regulations require annual reports by legal services programs that are based, in part, on the assessment of eligible clients' needs as expressed by their attitudes. These regulations are premised on unarticulated implicit assumptions relating attitudes, problems experienced, and legal need. This study examines these assumptions in an analysis of perceived problems, help seeking behavior, attitudes toward the allocation of legal services resources, and how these have changed over time for the eligible client population of one legal service program in California.     

Agenda Control in Congress: Evidence from Cutpoint Estimates and Ideal Point Uncertainty

This article develops two new tests of partisan and nonpartisan theories of lawmaking based on cutpoint estimates and measures of uncertainty about ideal point estimates. Theories of congressional organization make explicit predictions about the absence of cutpoints in certain intervals of the policy space. We test these theories with new cutpoint estimates and exploit the fact that the ideal points of members located far from the density of cutpoints are necessarily estimated with less precision. We validate our empirical approach through simulations, and we test three models of congressional organization using House roll call data from the 86th through the 110th Congresses (1959–2008). We find strong evidence of partisan agenda control. Our findings exhibit modest differences from the results predicted by Cox and McCubbins's party cartel theory: negative agenda control increases over time and is negatively correlated with the size of the blockout region.     

ESTIMATING A DOSE‐RESPONSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENGTH OF STAY AND FUTURE RECIDIVISM IN SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS*

The effect of sanctions on subsequent criminal activity is of central theoretical importance in criminology. A key question for juvenile justice policy is the degree to which serious juvenile offenders respond to sanctions and/or treatment administered by the juvenile court. The policy question germane to this debate is finding the level of confinement within the juvenile justice system that maximizes the public safety and therapeutic benefits of institutional confinement. Unfortunately, research on this issue has been limited with regard to serious juvenile offenders. We use longitudinal data from a large sample of serious juvenile offenders from two large cities to 1) estimate a causal treatment effect of institutional placement, as opposed to probation, on future rate of rearrest and 2) investigate the existence of a marginal effect (i.e., benefit) for longer length of stay once the institutional placement decision had been made. We accomplish the latter by determining a dose‐response relationship between the length of stay and future rates of rearrest and self‐reported offending. The results suggest that an overall null effect of placement exists on future rates of rearrest or self‐reported offending for serious juvenile offenders. We also find that, for the group placed out of the community, it is apparent that little or no marginal benefit exists for longer lengths of stay. Theoretical, empirical, and policy issues are outlined.     

TRIAL COURTS AS ORGANIZATIONS: A Critique and Synthesis

This article has two purposes: (1) to suggest that the informal workgroup is the most appropriate concept from organization theory to explain both participant behavior occurring in criminal trial courts and trial court outputs; and (2) to use the informal workgroup framework to structure the findings generated by previous studies of trial courts. The informal workgroup proves to be a useful way to account for the disjuncture between the adversarial expectations and regularized individual behavior patterns researchers find in criminal trial courts. Furthermore, this concept provides a vehicle to explain the development of uniformities in output such as a classification of criminals, the categorization of crime, and sentencing yardsticks. The conclusion discusses the implications of the informal workgroup for efforts aimed at court reform.