Organisational Structures in the Australian Public Service

This article examines the nature of the organisational structures found within the Australian Public service (APS). Four basic dimensions of organisational structure are distinguished: the degree of formalisation or bureaucratisation, the degree of differentiation or specialisation, hierarchy and the extent of centralisation. The article will show that variations in the organisational structure of the APS are attributable to a range of factors including the political context, size, task complexity, the grading system, considerations of efficiency and political factors. The relative importance of these factors varies according to which aspect of structure is examined. Mechanistic organisational structures predominate in the APS due to the nature of the tasks performed, the imperatives of political control and the requirements of staff classification.     

Performance and Accountability: Budget Reform in New Zealand

Since 1984, New Zealand has made major changes in public sector management. This article describes the perceived problems with the previous New Zealand system and discusses the reforms designed to address these problems. The changes attempt to increase efficiency by: (1) separating commercial functions from other government operations; (2) strengthening lines of ministerial and executive accountability; and (3) designing budget and financial management systems to improve measurement of public sector performance. This last reform includes shifting from an input to an output-based system, changing from cash to accrual accounting, and creating different forms of appropriations for different types of government activities. While it is too early to assess whether the reforms are successful, we note potential problems.     

Effects of Judicial Instructions and Case Characteristics in a Mock Jury Trial of Battered Women Who Kill

This study examined the effects of judicial instructions on the outcome of a mock jury trial that involved a woman who pleaded self-defense after killing her abusive spouse. Jurors were instructed to adopt either an objective or a subjective standard of reasonableness when reaching a verdict. Within objective/subjective instruction conditions, half of the juries viewed a case in which the woman killed her abuser while he was attacking her (confrontational) and the remaining half viewed a case in which she killed him while he was asleep (no confrontation). Juries in the subjective conditions returned significantly more not guilty verdicts than jurors in the objective conditions. At the individual juror level, participants hearing subjective instructions were significantly more likely to rate the defendant as not guilty than jurors given objective instructions when the abuse was nonconfrontational.     

The dynamics of de‐delegation: A principal–agent explanation of the reversal of private authority in international sport governance

What explains the reversal of transnational private rule‐making authority? Embedding constructivist insights within a rational principal–agent model, this article advances a five‐step sequential process that nuances the traditional explanation of delegitimation. It argues that entrepreneurs must first successfully promote the belief that the high costs of ineffective private policies follow from the private rule‐setter's flawed institutional attributes. Subsequently, a de‐delegation solution that minimizes transaction and uncertainty costs must be proposed. The examination of two cases in the field of international sport governance, namely the deliberate reversal of private authority in anti‐doping governance and the lack thereof in anti‐match‐fixing governance, lends support to these propositions. It sheds new light on the creation of the World Anti‐Doping Agency (WADA) and explains why there will probably be no counterpart to fight match‐fixing.     

Policy Formulation in Australian Government: Vertical and Horizontal Axes

Studies of the policy process in Australia have focused on particular institutions or decisions rather than on its overarching properties. One such property is the vertical and horizontal ‘axes’ of policy‐making. The former comprises hierarchical relationships whereas the latter comprise relationships of bargaining, negotiation and persuasion. Vertical axes enable governments to take and enforce technically rational decisions in pursuit of consistent goals whereas horizontal axes permit governments to make broadly‐based decisions that have group assent and electoral support. Vertical axes have strengthened in recent years and have brought increased technical rationality and consistency. This has come at a cost of limiting of the scope of political debate and a loss of electoral support for government though.     

Staff Selection in the Australian Public Service: A History of Social Closure

This paper argues that recruitment and promotion within the Australian Public Service (APS) have historically exemplified the practice of 'social closure'. Three periods of AP'S staff selection that correspond to what Halligan and Power identify as the bureaucratist/technicist, administrationist and political management models of executive branch regime are identified. Social closure in each instance was based on educational credentials or lack thereof. These practices have been justified in terms of various 'ideologies of promotion'. Such ideologies tend to reflect the ideal or material interests of social groups rather than the skill requirements of administrative work. The current form of social closure based on economics degrees illustrates this phenomenon. Accordingly, greater recognition of the value of non-economics degrees is required.