The Approved Narrative of the Srebrenica Massacre

The Srebrenica massacre has taken on both symbolic and mythical properties, all in the service of political agendas. The symbol is of Serb evil, manifested in an alleged cold-blooded and unprovoked massacre of innocents reminiscent of Nazi behavior during World War II. The myth is that 8000 Bosnian Muslim “men and boys” were executed in the vicinity of Srebrenica in July 1995, and that any executions there were unprovoked and carried out in accord with a genocidal plan. Both facts and language have had to be aggressively massaged to support these claims. The political agendas served by the massacre claims were those of the Bosnian Muslims, striving to get NATO to enter the Bosnian struggle more actively, the Croats, who needed a demonization of Serbs to carry out their own ethnic cleansing plans (most notably, removing 250,000 Serbs from Croatian Krajina in the very next month, August 1995), and the Clinton administration, under attack for a failure to intervene more actively on behalf of the Croats and Muslims and searching for an excuse to do so.This paper is partly drawn from and cites chapters in a forthcoming book on the Srebrenica massacre, Srebrenica: The Politics of War Crimes, written by George Bogdanich, Tim Fenton, Philip Hammond, Edward S. Herman, Michael Mandel, Jonathan Rooper, and George Szamuely. This book is referred to in the notes below as Politics of War Crimes. The author and his colleagues are indebted to Diana Johnstone, David Peterson, Vera Vratusa-Zunjic, Milan Bulajic, Milivoje Ivanisevic, Konstantin Kilibarda, and George Pumphrey for advice. Johnstone’s Fools Crusade is a fine basic statement of an alternative perspective on the Balkan Wars; George Pumphrey’s “Srebrenica: Three Years Later, And Still Searching,” is a classic critique of the establishment Srebrenica massacre narrative and repeatedly hit the target with facts and analyses still not rebutted.     

New Labour's modernization in the public sector: a neo-Durkheimian approach and the case of mental health services

Five accounts of New Labour's style of public management reform can be identified in the recent academic literature. Although each has merits, none is wholly convincing. After a discussion of their scope and limits, this article offers a distinctive account, grounded in wider social theory, which also synthesizes the most valuable elements in the five mainstream accounts. The article then uses the case of New Labour's reforms of the mental health system to support this account, showing how it exemplifies each of the 15 major strands of reform activity that have together been the hallmark of what in practice New Labour has meant by 'modernization'. This provides the basis for a critique of the limits and dangers of the New Labour style.     

Does E‐Government Promote Accountability? A Comparative Analysis of Website Openness and Government Accountability

Under the global pressure of information technology, the adoption of web-based technologies in public administration has created a new government-and-citizen interface. However, whether e-government will unambiguously lead to a more transparent, interactive, open and hence, accountable, government remains a central question. Applying a framework of global pressure effects on bureaucratic change, this paper conducts an empirical study on website openness and accountability in fourteen countries. Even when overall accountability levels rise, the accountability gap between different national bureaucracies often remains intact as web-based technologies typically maintain or reinforce the existing practices. The question of whether e-government promotes accountability depends on what kind of bureaucracy one is referring to in the first place. In the current debate about global convergence and national divergence on the effect of globalization on public bureaucracies, the spread of e-government provides a case of convergence in practice rather than in results.     

Uganda and U.S. Foreign Policy

Washington's relationships with the “leveraged allies” preferred by realists—those countries that have little choice but to follow America's lead—have long been considered more reliable than in its relationships with the “natural allies” favored by idealists: prosperous, democratic nations that share the goals and interests of the United States. President Bush's foreign policy requires these natural allies, but many U.S. government officials are more wary. Uganda under President Museveni is a model “natural ally” candidate, with its relatively humane and democratic internal policies, but its greater capacity to act without American leverage, approval, or supervision is likely to worry realist career diplomats.