National ownership and donor involvement: an aid paradox illustrated by the case of Rwanda

A paradox in current international development cooperation is comprised by the simultaneous insistence on national ownership and far-reaching donor involvement through policy dialogue. In order to better understand this combination of a strong ownership ideal and extensive donor presence, this article explores how national and external actors portray the process of formulating and revising development policies and programmes in an aid recipient country. The study is based on original empirical material from national as well as external actors involved in the aid relation in Rwanda which, despite heavy aid dependence, is known to have achieved relative policy independence. Analysed in relation to three strands of critical thought in previous research, findings show that, in Rwanda, the very top political leadership is actively involved in initiating and formulating policies; that there are instances of negotiation as well as strong disagreements between national and external actors; and that, rather than donors seeking to retain control, Rwanda is depicted as setting its own agenda and effectively managing its donors. The paradox of an ownership ideal combined with donor involvement is thus met by an apparent tendency among national as well as external actors to emphasise national ownership while toning down donor influence.     

People and Performance: Challenges for the Future Public Service— the Report from the Wye River Conference

What are the key challenges for the public sector at present, and what will the future public service look like if it is to meet these challenges? These questions were put to public‐sector leaders at a conference at the Wye River Plantation in June 1999. The leaders agreed on aspects of a broad vision for the future and the urgent need for a detailed debate on the transition questions that arose.     

Optimal Central Bank Conservativeness in an Open Economy

This paper develops a graphical method to determinethe optimal degree of central bank conservativeness inan open economy. Unlike Rogoff (1985a), the upper andlower bounds of the interval containing the optimaldegree of conservativeness are expressed in terms ofthe structural parameters of the model. It is shownthat optimal central bank conservativeness is higher,the higher the natural rate of unemployment, thegreater the benefits of unanticipated inflation, theless inflation-averse society, the smaller thevariance of productivity shocks, the smaller realexchange rate variability and the smaller the opennessof the economy. These propositions are tested fornineteen industrial countries for the period1960–1993. In testing the model we employ a latentvariables method (LISREL) in order to distinguishbetween actual and optimal monetary regimes.     

Juvenile Sexual Murderers: Examination and Classification of the Crime-Commission Process

This study aims to empirically explore the crime-commission process of juvenile sexual homicide offenders (SHOs). First, a comparison between the crime-commission process of juvenile and adult SHOs is undertaken, while as a second step, this study also provides an empirical classification specific to juvenile SHOs. The sample used in this study consists of 55 juvenile SHOs and 281 adult SHOs. A sequential binomial regression was used to compare at the multivariate level the two groups of offenders, while a latent class analysis was used to examine the relationships between each step of the crime-commission process of juvenile SHOs. Our findings suggest that the crime-commission process of juvenile SHOs present differences when compared with adult SHOs. Moreover, we identified four different patterns in juvenile sexual homicide: explosive opportunistic, sadistic, overcontrolled anger, and predator. Theoretical and practical implications in terms of criminal investigations as well as offenders’ management and treatment are discussed.     

Sexual Identities and Protesting Among College Students: Exploring Political Distinctiveness Mediation Factors

This study examines the links between sexual identity and participation in political protests. Among a sample of college students (N?=?2175), we determined that sexual minority students were three times more likely to join a protest than heterosexual students. “Political distinctiveness” theories are used to explain this sexual identity gap in protesting. Following a series of path analyses, we conclude that marital status, exposure to discrimination (as a victim or observer), connections to LGB communities, participation in political groups, and liberal identities mediate the sexuality difference in protesting. Conversely, measures of educational attainment, exposure to multicultural classes, and internalized homophobia were not mediators.

     

The Expert Witness in England and Wales: The End of the 'Hired Gun'? An English Perspective

The role of the expert witness has seen some significant changes since April 1999 with the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 ('CPR'). This paper sets out to explain the role of the expert witness in civil cases in England and Wales and seeks to demonstrate that, to a large extent, the days of the 'hired gun' expert are now dead and gone.     

Civil Rights,Federalism, and the Administrative Process: Favorable Outcomes by Federal,State, and Local Agencies in Housing Discrimination Complaints

Some theorists argue that cooperative intergovernmental relations are critical to policy implementation in the United States. This assertion is explored in the context of fair housing enforcement by comparing favorable administrative outcomes in fair housing complaints at the federal, state, and local levels from 1989 to 2004. What conclusions can be drawn from this systematic comparison of intergovernmental enforcement in one policy area over an extended period of time? First, cooperative federalism works well in fair housing enforcement. Second, of special significance, state civil rights agencies resolve complaints in favor of complainants nearly as often as the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and localities sometimes do so even more frequently.     

Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: A coordination game among rational legislators

Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.