The Olson ratio and indirectly endogenous rent

Public Choice - We consider an economy where the rent value depends indirectly on value-adding investment of agents (thus indirectly endogenous) and the win-probability is a function of rent...     

Chronic disease and disadvantage: the new politics of HIV infection

HIV infection is now perceived as the end stage of a chronic disease that is spreading most rapidly among blacks and Hispanics. The politics of the HIV epidemic in the 1980s were dominated by four interacting factors: fear and fascination; who had the disease and to whom it seemed to be spreading; the endemic problems of United States social policy; and the impact on policy of advances in scientific knowledge. This paper analyzes the political history of each of these factors and describes the dominant policies of the federal government and the states regarding HIV in the areas of surveillance, prevention, research, and financing. Four uncertainties will have a profound influence on the future politics of the HIV epidemic: how the states and the federal government will address the general problems of paying for the care of people with chronic diseases and providing access to care for the uninsured and the underinsured; the number and distribution of the sexual behaviors that transmit infection with HIV and the effectiveness of policies to persuade people to modify these behaviors; precisely who uses addictive drugs and the effectiveness of measures to change their behavior; and the natural history of the virus.     

Chinese democracy: The lessons of failure

China's experiments with democracy in this century were few in number, short in duration, and limited in their democratic characteristics. Democratic institutions malfunctioned in numerous ways. Nine sets of causes for the failure of Chinese democracy can be suggested: ideology, internal and external war, military intervention, Chinese political culture, underdevelopment, a peasant mass, flaws in the design of Chinese constitutions, moral failures by democratic politicians, or the lack of transactional benefits for military‐based elites in the process of democratic transition. Each of these factors is reviewed critically with an eye to its possible lessons.     

The political economy of the peace dividend

We develop a model of the peace dividend and use it to predict the fiscal consequences of a reduction in the demand for military spending. The model is based on the assumption that the political process responds to political demands and costs in a way that maximizes net political benefits. The predictions of our model on how a peace dividend will be allocated over nonmilitary spending, tax relief, and deficit reduction is tested against the experience of eight major wars in United States history.