Measurement of airborne gunshot particles in a ballistics laboratory by sector field inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry

The present study aimed determines lead (Pb), antimony (Sb) and barium (Ba) as the major elements present in GSR in the environmental air of the Ballistics Laboratory of the S?o Paulo Criminalistics Institute (I.C.-S.P.), S?o Paulo, SP, Brazil. Micro environmental monitors (mini samplers) were located at selected places. The PM(2.5) fraction of this airborne was collected in, previously weighted filters, and analyzed by sector field inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer (SF-HR-ICP-MS). The higher values of the airborne lead, antimony and barium, were found at the firing range (lead (Pb): 58.9 μg/m(3); barium (Ba): 6.9 μg/m(3); antimony (Sb): 7.3 μg/m(3)). The mean value of the airborne in this room during 6 monitored days was Pb: 23.1 μg/m(3); Ba: 2.2 μg/m(3); Sb: 1.5 μg/m(3). In the water tank room, the air did not show levels above the limits of concern. In general the airborne lead changed from day to day, but the barium and antimony remained constant. Despite of that, the obtained values suggest that the workers may be exposed to airborne lead concentration that can result in an unhealthy environment and could increase the risk of chronic intoxication.     

A new approach to developing institutional structure

This article describes an approach developed to assess the institutional capacity of whole governments. It discusses the evolving context in Latin America and the Caribbean for public sector reforms and the impact of structural adjustment and globalization on international agency policies on the issue. It reviews national and sectoral organizational networks, the profile of a modern public administration, and the definition of public management horizontal and vertical systems; explains how integration of horizontal management system reforms is attained at the ministry level, and addresses the issue of performance management and use of an elite managerial and technical corps. Finally, it describes techniques used to plan changes in strategies.     

Federalism and low-maintenance constituencies: Territorial dimensions of economic reform in Argentina

How does the territorial distribution of political and economic resources within national polities influence politics and policy making? This article examines the electoral dynamics of market reform in Argentina between 1989 and 1995. It provides insights into the way that the distribution of economic and institutional resources in federal systems shapes policy making and coalition building options for reformist governments. The electoral viability of the governing Peronist Party during the economic reform period was facilitated by the regional phasing of the costs of market reform. Structural reforms were concentrated primarily on economically developed regions of the country, while public spending and patronage in economically marginal but politically overrepresented regions sustained support for the governing party. Statistical analyses contrast patterns of spending and public sector employment in “metropolitan” and “peripheral” regions of the country during the reform period, as well as the social bases of electoral support in those regions. A conceptual distinction between “high-maintenance” and “low-maintenance” constituencies is also introduced to shed light on the dynamics of patronage spending in contexts of market reform.     

Terrorism in Italy: Analysis of a problem

The author, after a short premise in which the phenomenon under examination is analyzed on the basis of the study of individual motivations, considers, in the context of the present Italian moral crisis, the social and interpersonal factors that violent terrorism generate.

The inquiry then moves on to attempt to identify the aims of terrorism through the observation of the subsequent phases through which it develops.

After a short survey of some sociological and psychological theories of the causes of the phenomenon, the author concludes that the problem of terrorism cannot be solved through the threat of more serious sanctions for the crimes committed but through the reorganization and restructuring of the state, and the elimination of the insecurity and tension that are among the main causes of the phenomenon.     

Multiparty politics in Argentina? Electoral rules and changing patterns

This article attempts to illuminate some institutional features of the past and the current electoral systems of Argentina and the problematic relationship between these characteristics and the trend of changes that the party system has been experiencing since the return of democracy in 1983. The focus is on the dangers of political stalemate that might have developed if the institutional arrangements implemented at the end of the military rule had not been reformed subsequently. The study has two objectives: (a) to demonstrate that there is a trend towards an increasing fractionalization of the Argentine party system; and (b) to show that the combination of an electoral college with a majority requirement, proportional representation to allocate presidential electors, malapportionment among districts, and this increasing process of pluralization in most provinces (where presidential elections were decided because of electoral college complexities) threatened the stability of democracy.     

Bribing Voters

We present a model of influence over collective decisions made through voting. We show how an outside party offering incentives to a committee can manipulate the committee's decisions at no cost and induce inefficient outcomes. A key condition is that the outsider be able to reward decisive votes differently. Inefficiency results from voting externalities. We relax all initial assumptions to investigate how to insulate committees. We study different information settings, credibility assumptions, payoff structures (voters caring about the collective decision and about their own votes), and incentive schemes (offers contingent on pivotal votes, individual votes, vote shares, and the collective decision). We analyze when voting should be made secret; we elucidate the role of individual accountability and various political institutions in preventing vote buying. We discuss implications for lobbying, for clientelism, for decisions in legislatures, boards, and central banks, and for the efficiency of democracy .