Joint Land Certification Programmes and Women’s Empowerment: Evidence from Ethiopia

This paper connects two important development policy issues: women’s empowerment and land certification. We use propensity score matching to study the impact of the Ethiopian joint land registration and certification programme on women’s empowerment. Data are collected using surveys and a field experiment, enabling construction of complementary indices for empowerment. Our main result is that joint land certification has significant effects on women’s empowerment, particularly on dimensions that indicate female participation and roles outside the home. This result is robust to various sensitivity checks and alternative model specifications.     

Market segmentation in child adoption

The system for the adoption of children is not working well. The dysfunction of the adoption system manifests itself in an excess demand for healthy white babies and excess supply of older children, minority children, or those with disabilities. A market solution can increase the number of adoptions for older children, minority children or children with disabilities. Recognizing the heterogeneity of children and taking account of those differences will yield price differentiation in segmented markets. Such differentiation is especially important in the market for adopted children where the lifetime consequences of a poor match can be severe; more information about child attributes can only improve child-adopter matches. Revenues from the sale of adoption rights for highly demanded children could subsidize the adoption of the less desired children. The time to adoption will decrease and more of the less desired children will be adopted; the sum of consumer (adoptive parents) plus producer (biological mothers or the adoption agencies) surplus will rise and eliminate sub rosa markets for the more desired children.     

Limitation of medical research in German law.

In Germany, pharmaceutical trials and the testing of medical devices is regulated by statute. Any other kind of medical experimentation is handled according to the Declaration of Helsinki. Medical experimentation has to be reviewed by an ethics committee before the start and there has to be an elaborate research protocol, which provides for the protection of the experimental subject. In case of an accident, there is compulsory accident insurance as far as pharmaceutical trials and the testing of medical devices are concerned. The third party accident insurance just covers material loss, there is no provision paying and suffering. The sum paid by the insurance company is set off against damages for negligence. There is no strict liability for medical experimentation, but the German courts are expected to set very high standards for medical care in experimentation. The data protection and medical confidentiality have been lessened because of the European law that requires the experimental subject to give his consent to the inspection of the data or the file and if he takes part in the experimentation, that his data and some of his cells might be with the pharmaceutical company forever. In general, the German law seems to be adequate to the protection of experimental subjects.     

Comparing Implementation Processes in Sweden and the United States

This article attempts a systematic comparison of how policy is implemented in Sweden and the United States. We suggest that differences might be explained by examining policymaking processes, policy content, and governmental structure. The comparison reveals differences in 'incentive structure'. Both Sweden and the U.S. have responded to the complexity and uncertainty that accompanies increased demands on central government by adopting 'softer' mechanisms for implementation. The effect of these shifts in both systems is to devolve important decisions to lower levels of government. In Sweden, this devolution is still accompanied by strong incentives for national policymakers to undertake implementation, although the incentives may not be as strong as they were in the past. In the U.S., it is accompanied by a radical weakening of incentives to carry out implementation and increasing instability in policy content and relations among key actors.     

On the looting of nations

We develop a dynamic discrete choice model of an unchecked ruler making decisions regarding the development of a resource rich country. Resources serve as collateral and facilitate the acquisition of loans. The ruler chooses either to stay in power while facing the risk of being ousted, or loot the country??s riches by liquefying the resources through lending. We show that unstructured lending from international credit markets can create incentives to loot the country; and an enhanced likelihood of looting causes greater political instability, and diminishes growth. Using a treatment effects model, we find evidence that supports our predictions.     

Resources and Governance in Sierra Leone’s Civil War

Abstract

We empirically investigate the role of natural resources, and governance in explaining variation in the intensity of conflict during the 1991–2002 civil war in Sierra Leone. As a proxy for governance quality we exploit exogenous variation in political competition at the level of the chieftaincy. As a proxy for resources we use data on the location of pre-war mining sites. Our main result is that neither governance nor resources robustly explains the onset or duration of violence during the civil war in Sierra Leone.