The Revenge of Geopolitics

On the eve of Bill Clinton's second term, Harvey Sicherman wrote that the President must educate public opinion, cultivate congressional consensus, manage international coalitions, and use military power decisively when needed.     

Serdyukov Promotes Systemic Russian Military Reform

Despite the manifold problems in Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov's radical reform agenda, there is clear evidence that such a program is being implemented regardless of opposition from those in uniform, especially on the General Staff. It is no exaggeration to suggest that depending on how fully it is implemented, this reform could have an impact on the lives of all Russian officers no matter where they serve now. The mass mobilization principle has been abandoned and the transition from a division-based system to the new brigade structure is complete. Meanwhile, despite careful planning by the General Staff, we do not believe the Russian military will emerge as a modern fighting force until 2020, if then. Budget cuts, production inefficiencies, poor maintenance and sloppy work will all inhibit the construction of a modern Russian army.

This is essentially a totally different army, the foundation of which was laid this year. And this is the country's organizational victory.(Colonel (retired) Vitaliy Shlykov, Liliya Biryukova, Aleksandr Sargin, Denis Telmanov, Gazeta, November 20, 2009.)

     

The insider threat and employee privacy: An overview of recent case law

The detection of insider threats is one area of ongoing work at the CERT^® Insider Threat Center. This paper addresses the legal landscape surrounding employee privacy in the workplace. While this broad area implicates many different types of law, this paper focuses on some current issues that employers may want to be aware of when implementing policies and practices to mitigate the insider threat, including monitoring of current employees. Electronic, physical and other methods of monitoring are discussed, which can reveal insider threat indicators. Relevant federal and state laws are also discussed.¹     

History Rhymes: The German Precedent for Chinese Seapower

We compare the rise of Chinese seapower today to the rise of Imperial German seapower a century ago. The comparison is worthwhile for two reasons. First, the comparison holds merits in its own right. We use German Admiral Wolfgang Wegener's three indices of seapower-strategic position, the fleet, and strategic will to the sea-to assess the two countries’ maritime potential. This analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that China holds far more potential for seapower that did the Kaiser's Germany. And second, the Chinese themselves are consulting German history as they inquire into the triumphs and failures of past great powers. Trying to divine how they interpret the German experience could let Western practitioners and scholars of grand strategy glimpse China's maritime future. In turn they can improve their own handling of strategy in East Asia.     

Can the United States Do Grand Strategy?

Two big issues that scholars and strategists need to address are simply: does grand strategy have to be articulated for it to be said to exist at all; and if not, can grand strategy be said to move a nation even when that nation's fluctuating roster of (often competent) leaders are unsure as to why they do anything? My task here is that of a rapporteur and provocateur raising issues on which we may need to reach some consensus.     

The challenge and imperative of private sector cybersecurity: An international comparison

Attacks on computers and information networks, both public and private, are disclosed in the news daily. Most recently, Apple, Facebook, and Twitter acknowledged that they were attacked and were now taking additional measures to secure their networks. In January of 2013, Kaspersky Labs reported discovering malware that not only targeted government information in Eastern Europe, former Soviet republics, and Central Asia, but also had been actively doing so since 2007. The scope of global cyber attacks is staggering and the solutions to securing property and protecting national security are illusive, in large part because infrastructure is owned and operated by private, rather than public, entities. Nations struggle with choosing the most effective strategy and potential regulation of the private sector in order to reduce overall cybersecurity risk. This paper reviews the nature of cyber threats, and compares the United States and European approach to promoting cybersecurity in the private sector. Furthermore, the paper discusses how different approaches can affect cybersecurity risk, and suggests a framework for visualizing the impact of law and strategy on security.