The Early Introduction of Cocoa to West Africa

While going through old records at Kew, Dr. Howes discoveredsome papers which shed and interesting light on the earliestdays of attempts to establish cacao on the West Coast. He haswritten this note at our invitation.     

The paradox of grading systems

We distinguish between (i) voting systems in which voters can rank candidates and (ii) those in which they can grade candidates, using two or more grades. In approval voting, voters can assign two grades only—approve (1) or not approve (0)—to candidates. While two grades rule out a discrepancy between the average-grade winners, who receive the highest average grade, and the superior-grade winners, who receive more superior grades in pairwise comparisons (akin to Condorcet winners), more than two grades allow it. We call this discrepancy between the two kinds of winners the paradox of grading systems, which we illustrate with several examples and whose probability we estimate for sincere and strategic voters through a Monte Carlo simulation. We discuss the tradeoff between (i) allowing more than two grades, but risking the paradox, and (ii) precluding the paradox, but restricting voters to two grades.     

State and society in Western Europe: A model for comparative analysis

This article represents an attempt to analyse the complex historical processes of political change in Western Europe in the context of an explicit frame of enquiry. It is concerned to establish not only that the past illuminates the present but also that conceptual rigour and the purposive use of analysis provided by a framework of general ideas is as much relevant to making sense of the past as of the present. The model is a deliberate simplification and, of course, open to refinement. Its virtue is parsimony; its purpose, to enable indentification of the predominant type of political organisation in a concrete political situation.     

Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation – The Case of Europol

Abstract

This article analyses the gap between government ambitions and actual outcomes in the case of European counter terrorism intelligence cooperation. Specifically, it investigates why Europol has not managed to live up to its tasks despite outspoken government support. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, the study suggests why bureaucrats might be motivated to resist calls for international cooperation. By examining the process by which Europol has developed as an actor in the counter terrorism field, this article shows how development in the field of intelligence cooperation is not exclusively the reflection of government preferences. It concludes by suggesting that scholars could gain greater insight from a less state centric approach to the study of intelligence. In addition, the article suggests that policy makers cultivate a greater familiarity with bureaucratic factors and that they continually work with those factors in mind.