Voter turnout: How much can we explain?

This paper evaluates the ability of common explanatory variables to predict who votes. Logit voting regressions are estimated with more than three dozen explanatory variables using survey and aggregate data for the 1979, 1980, 1984, and 1988 Canadian national elections. We find that the usual demographic variables such as age and education, and contextual variables such as campaign spending have significant effects on the probability of voting, but the models have low R2's and cannot predict who votes more accurately than random guessing. We also estimate regressions using past voting behavior as a predictor of current behavior, and find that although the explanatory power rises it remains low. This suggests that the difficulty in explaining turnout arises primarily from omitted time- varying variables. In some sense, then, it appears that whether or not a person votes is to a large degree random. The evidence provides support for the rational voter theory, and is problematic for psycho/sociological approaches.     

Reversal of fortune: the politics and economics of the superconducting supercollider

Congress approved the superconducting supercollider (SSC), but later cut all funding after construction for the project had begun. We claim that this reversal was due, in part, to a problem of time inconsistency. Representatives from states in contention to receive the project had an incentive to support it early in the process. Once Texas was chosen as the SSC site, the other contender states had a greatly diminished incentive to continue to support it. Our empirical results show that the probability of switching from ‘for’ to ‘against’ the project is significantly higher for representatives from the former contender states.     

Decentralization and the post-war political economy

Abstract This paper uses cross–national data for 21 OECD nations to examine whether there is evidence of a connection between measures of political and fiscal decentralization and the major, long–term, performance parameters of the post–war political economy. Findings of what is necessarily an exploratory analysis of a wide range of policy outcomes suggest that federalism and the proliferation of constitutional veto–points have inhibited the expansion of the socially protective state and that a low level of fiscal centralization appears to have restrained post–war inflationary pressures and gone along with higher rates of post–war economic growth. No evidence is found to connect either political or fiscal measures with postwar labour market performance.     

Globalization and the erosion of democracy

Despite the apparent development and spread of liberal democratic state forms in the 1980s and 1990s, possibilities for genuine democratic governance overall are declining. Firstly, the emergence and consolidation of modern liberal democracy was inextricably intertwined with the development of the nation–state and is profoundly socially embedded in that structural context. Secondly, in today's globalizing world, cross–cutting and overlapping governance structures and processes increasingly take private, oligarchic (and mixed public/ private) forms; hegemonic neoliberal norms are delegitimizing state–based governance in general; and democratic states are losing the policy capacity necessary for transforming democratically generated inputs into authoritative outputs. Consequently, robust constraints limit the potential for (a) reinstitutionalizing the 'democratic chain' between accountability and effectiveness, (b) rearticulating the multitasking character of authoritative institutions and (c) renewing the capacity of authoritative agents to make the side–payments and to undertake the monitoring necessary to control free–riding and assimilate alienated groups. Rather than a new pluralistic global civil society, globalization is more likely to lead to a growth in inequalities, a fragmentation of effective governance structures and the multiplication of quasi–fiefdoms reminiscent of the Middle Ages.     

Latin America in a time of global financial turmoil∗

Following the financial turmoil in Asia and Russia, Latin America has suffered dramatic setbacks, including major economic slowdown, threats to democratization, and worsening social conditions. For the medium term, neither prosperity nor political stability are assured, says Abraham F. Lowenthal, founding president of the Pacific Council on International Policy at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. Lowenthal identifies three positive shifts that have occurred in the region over the past few years: a convergence among economic policymakers on the main tenets of sound policy; an even more widespread embrace of constitutional democracy as an ideal; and a growing disposition on the part of Latin American nations toward pragmatic cooperation with each other and with the industrialized countries, including the United States.