Blocks of colour IV: the evidential value of blue and red cotton fibres.

Samples of blue and red cotton fibres were examined using light and fluorescence microscopy as well as UV/VIS microspectrophotometry and fluorescence microspectroscopy. The degree of fluorescence and spectral variation was recorded. Particular attention was paid to the recurrence of certain spectral patterns. The importance of spectral information in the UV range is emphasized again. Colour plays a critical role in the comparison of cotton fibres in forensic sciences. Normally, fibres producing spectral patterns that are frequently seen will tend to have a lower evidential value in criminal cases as the choice of putative sources is theoretically greater and vice versa. Besides black cotton, blue and red cotton fibres are very frequent in fibre casework. The very high discriminating power using a combination of light microscopy, fluorescence microscopy and UV/VIS microspectrophotometry shows that even blue and red cotton fibres can provide excellent evidence when involved in fibre transfer cases.     

A survey of the incidence of missing anterior teeth: potential value in bite mark analysis.

Bite mark analysis involves comparison of individual dental characteristics between a dentition and the bite injury. A bite mark injury may result from sexual assault, or physical assault, and defensive injuries, and as such can be used to link a suspect to a victim or vice versa. Missing teeth are one of the characteristics that could implicate or exclude a suspected biter. However frequency data for use by forensic odontologists can only be collated from epidemiological studies. Therefore an audit was undertaken of missing anterior teeth in adult patients (n = 1010) attending for treatment, gathering data that could be more relevant to odontology. One in five of the sample presented with missing teeth that were either replaced with a denture (11%), not replaced (6%) or missing with the gap closed (2%).     

Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion

Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions or what determines their success. These events are often explained away as "symbolic politics" driven completely by domestic-level factors. This article develops a simple game-theoretic model of economic coercion to show that both "senders" and "targets" of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behavior. Conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect on coercion events. First, senders that anticipate frequent conflicts will be more willing to initiate economic coercion, even if such attempts are costly. Senders that anticipate few conflicts will not threaten sanctions unless they incur minimal costs and the target would suffer significantly. While a robust anticipation of future disputes might make the sender prefer a coercive strategy, it also reduces its ability to obtain concessions. Target states that anticipate frequent conflict with the sender will make fewer concessions. Ironically, a sender will obtain the most favorable distribution of payoffs when it cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. These hypotheses are tested statistically, with the results strongly supporting the conflict expectations model.     

Prescriptive and Elicitive Approaches to Conflict Resolution: Examples from Papua New Guinea

Negotiation Journal -