THE BEHAVIOUR OF LEGISLATORS AND BUREAUCRATS AND POLICING EXPENDITURES: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS*

Abstract: This paper is concerned with an analysis of legislation, public administration and government expenditure decisions on policing activities. These three dimensions of government can be used as mechanisms of social control. Whether they are or not is an empirical question that has to be determined in each case. It is shown that there are no strict relationships between the three dimensions of government activity: separate decision-making is undertaken for each of the three dimensions. It is indicated that there are eight possible combinations of the three dimensions, assuming that the three dimensions of government activity are bivariate and discrete. The empirical analysis relates to the state of Queensland and it is concluded that Queensland can be described as a case consisting of authoritarian legislation, public administration contrary to the rule of law, and low policing expenditures.     

S&;T Parks and business incubators in middle-sized countries: the case of greece

This paper links the policy context regarding S&T parks to the objectives and characteristics of the established parks and incubators in a relatively small, converging European country. S&T parks and incubators in Greece during the past decade and a half have gradually shifted in terms of ownership and management from university/research institute to the private sector and in terms of financing from public to private funds, also involving the provision of seed capital and access to venture capital. This gradual shift toward more private engagement has created a variety of models out of which, it is hoped, successful innovative companies will emerge in larger numbers than in the past.

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Lawyers of the Right: Networks and Organization

Lawyers for conservative and libertarian causes are active in organizing and mobilizing interest groups within the conservative coalition, and networks of relationships among those lawyers help to maintain and shape the coalition. Using data gathered in interviews with seventy-two such lawyers, this article analyzes characteristics of the lawyers and the structure of their networks. The findings suggest that the networks are divided into segments or blocks that are identified with particular constituencies, but that a distinct set of actors with extensive relationships serves to bridge the constituencies. Measures of centrality and brokerage confirm the structural importance of these actors in the network, and a search of references in news media confirms their prominence or prestige. This "core" set of actors occupies the "structural hole" in the network that separates the business constituency from religious conservatives. Libertarians, located near the core of the network, also occupy an intermediate position. Regression analysis of ties within the network suggests that the Federalist Society plays an important role in bringing the lawyers together.     

The evolution of European legal integration

This article contributes to the development of theories on European integration by testing and exploring statistical models on the long-term development of legislative activity of the European Commission. Drawing on legal information gained from the European Union’s PreLex database and analyzing it with the help of statistical analyses, we map out growth patterns of EU law between 1976 and 2003. We construct time-series models and models based on non-linear regression. While the performance of models based on the traditional theoretical approaches, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, is rather poor, the analysis suggests that nonlinear dynamic models might be an interesting avenue for future conceptualizations of the EU integration process. This article is based on a paper presented at the ECPR Standing Group on the European Union Second Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, “Implications of a Wider Europe: Politics, Institutions and Diversity”, 24–26 June 2004, Bologna, Italy. We would like to thank the seminar participants for useful comments.     

The effect of board size and composition on European bank performance

Banks are “special” financial institutions generating distinct corporate governance challenges. The present paper examines the relationship between two of the most pertinent corporate governance factors—that is, the size of the Board of Directors and the proportion of non-executive directors—and firm performance on a sample of 58 large European banks over the period 2002–2004. The empirical analysis embraces a number of bank-specific variables. Our results reveal that bank profitability is negatively related to the size of the Board of Directors, while the impact of Board composition, although positive in all models, is, in most cases, insignificant. The results are robust after controlling for firm-specific variables.      

Bureaupreneurs in China: we did it our way

This article explores the different and sometimes conflicting explanations of the success of the collective enterprises (town–village-enterprise) in China during the first phase of transition (1979–1995). It is argued that explanations, relying on cultural variables are not sustainable and this for two reasons. First, the importance of the collective enterprise is shrinking while the private sector is clearly on the rise. Second, other factors, referring to characteristics of the local and central political, administrative and economic environment, in which the Chinese enterprise has to (had to?) operate, provide for a sufficient explanation of the peculiar structure of the Chinese collective enterprises. These enterprises are seen as the result of ?bureau-preneurship’ because local bureaucrats were integrated in their management in order to pre-empt predatory behaviour and to facilitate the relationships with the central institutions. The article contributes to the property rights’ theory of the firm as it analyses an empirically very important case in which firms with unclear property rights and structures, apparently not conducive for incentives, might still be the most efficient option.