Neocorporatism and the 'happiness index', or what the trade unions get for their cooperation

Abstract. In concluding a recent analysis of the conditions for trade union wage restraint, Colin Crouch asks 'what neocorporatist unions gain for their members in exchange for restraint?'. An attempt to answer this question is made, first by examining a range of policy outcomes which may be regarded as measures of possible union gains, and, second, by analyzing the problem in terms of indexes measuring possible trade-offs between union objectives. It is suggested that an analysis in these latter terms offers a far more cogent explanation of trade union wage restraint than can be provided by looking at policy outcome measures separately.     

CRIME AS AN OCCUPATION

Students of crime have traditionally stressed the uniqueness of the criminal world and have developed special concepts in their attempt to explain the functioning of this “special” domain. In contrast, others in the field have asserted that the concepts used to investigate the coventional world can also be employed to provide insight into its criminal counterpart. This sentiment has been particularly evident among those who have utilized the concept of “occupation” to analyze criminal behavior. Building on the “crime as work” perspective, this research illustrates that, similar to conventional occupations, criminal work is stratified by prestige and stereotyped by sex. Further, the data suggest that Davis and Moore's (1945) functional theory may be a useful explanation not only of the stratification of conventional work but of criminal occupations as well.     

English Prosecutions: Twenty Years of Changing Institutions and Values

Twenty years ago England had a prosecutorial system founded upon traditional values. In 1986, a Crown Prosecution Service founded upon the values of modern rationalized bureaucracy will be introduced. In 1966, English prosecutions were overwhelmingly police conducted, often without legal assistance. By the mid-seventies, a majority of police forces had created ad hoc, non-statutory prosecuting solicitors departments. In 1986, a statutory professional prosecuting national bureaucratic service independent of the police will replace the traditional prosecutorial structures. This twenty-year change provides an excellent example of a Weberian movement from traditional to bureaucratic institutions and has enormous implications for further change in remaining traditionally based English criminal justice institutions.